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Free Choice Permission is Strong Permission

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Abstract

Free choice permission, a crucial test case concerning the semantics/ pragmatics boundary, usually receives a pragmatic treatment. But its pragmatic features follow from its semantics. We observe that free choice inferences are defeasible, and defend a semantics of free choice permission as strong permission expressed in terms of a modal conditional in a nonmonotonic logic.

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Correspondence to Nicholas Asher.

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Asher, N., Bonevac, D. Free Choice Permission is Strong Permission. Synthese 145, 303–323 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-6196-z

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