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Anti-luck epistemology

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Abstract

In this paper, I do three things. First, I offer an overview of an anti-luck epistemology, as set out in my book, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). Second, I attempt to meet some of the main criticisms that one might level against the key theses that I propose in this work. And finally, third, I sketch some of the ways in which the strategy of anti-luck epistemology can be developed in new directions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland, UK

    Duncan Pritchard

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  1. Duncan Pritchard
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Correspondence to Duncan Pritchard.

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Pritchard, D. Anti-luck epistemology. Synthese 158, 277–297 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7

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