Abstract
Nearly all of the ways philosophers currently attempt to define the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function’ undermine the scientific application of those terms by rendering the scientific explanations in which they occur vacuous. Since this is unacceptable, we must develop analyses of these terms that avoid this vacuity.
Robert Cummins argues in this fashion in Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. He accuses ‘use theories’ of representational content of generating vacuous explanations, claims that nearly all current theories of representational content are use theories, and offers a non-use theory of representational content which avoids explanatory vacuity. One task I undertake in this article is to develop an alternative non-use theory which avoids an objection fatal to that theory.
My second task is to adapt Cummins’ argument to criticize most current analyses of ‘function,’ which undermine scientific explanation in an analogous way. Though Cummins does not explicitly argue in this manner, his own analysis of ‘function,’ by avoiding any appeal to use, avoids the explanatory vacuity to which they succumb. Consequently, I endorse Cummins’ notion of function.
However, although use theories fail as analyses of the terms ‘representation’ and ‘function,’ they can still make significant contributions to the sciences employing these terms. For, while philosophers seeking to define ‘representation’ and ‘function’ must avoid incorporating representational and functional uses into their definitions, scientists must still find a way to determine which representations and functions are being used. Suitably re-construed use theories of representation and function may in many cases assist them in this task.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Boorse C. (2002). A rubuttal on functions. In: Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds). Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 63–112
Cummins R. (1975). Functional analysis. In: Sober E. (Ed.), 2001, Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology (2nd ed., pp. 49–70). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Cummins R. (1996). Representations, targets and attitudes. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Cummins R. (2000). Reply to Millikan. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LX(1): 113–127
Cummins R. (2002). Neo-Teleology. In: Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds). Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 157–172
Fodor J. (1987). Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Millikan R. (1984) Language, thought and other biological Categories. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Millikan R. (2000) Representations, targets and attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LX(1): 103–111
Perlman M. (2002). Pagan teleology. In: Ariew A., Cummins R., Perlman M. (eds). Functions: New essays in the philosophy of psychology and biology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 263–290
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Press, J.K. The scientific use of ‘representation’ and ‘function’: avoiding explanatory vacuity. Synthese 161, 119–139 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9154-5
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9154-5