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Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention

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Abstract

In this paper I will argue that Crispin Wright’s defence of the claim that the truth about intention is judgement-dependent is unstable because it can serve also to establish that the truth about shape is judgement-dependent, thereby violating his constraint that in developing the distinction between judgement-independent and judgement-dependent subject matters we have to be driven by the assumption that colour and shape will fall on different sides of the divide.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, B152TT, UK

    Alexander Miller

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  1. Alexander Miller
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Correspondence to Alexander Miller.

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Miller, A. Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention. Synthese 171, 433–442 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9316-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9316-8

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