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Real rules

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Abstract

Wright is correct in surmising that Wittgenstein’s refusal to be drawn into the metaphysical and epistemological questions that his own discussion of rules allegedly raises results from his rejection of the assumptions that pit the Platonist against the communitarian. This paper shows why the entire idea (which continues to dazzle philosophers)—that in speaking a language or in engaging in other normative practices we are operating a calculus according to strict rules—has to be rejected. It results, in part, from the conflation of different understandings of ‘knowing the rules’: one in which rules can be ‘read off’ from the practice by a theorist and those in which expressions of rules are consulted within the course of the practice.

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Correspondence to Julia Tanney.

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I am very pleased to have been invited to contribute to this collection in celebration of the work of Crispin Wright and can think of a no more appropriate way of expressing over 20 years’ worth of appreciation and affection toward my teacher, mentor, champion, and friend than by getting straight to work.

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Tanney, J. Real rules. Synthese 171, 499–507 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9326-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9326-6

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