Abstract
In this paper I discuss two fundamental challenges concerning Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project: first, whether entitlement is an epistemic kind of warrant since, seemingly, it is not underwritten by epistemic reasons, and, second, whether, in the absence of such reasons, the kind of rationality associated with entitlement is epistemic in nature. The paper investigates three possible lines of response to these challenges. According to the first line of response, entitlement of cognitive project is underwritten by epistemic reasons—and thus supports epistemic rationality—because, when P is an entitlement, trust in P is a dominant strategy with respect to promotion of epistemic value. The second line of response replaces dominance with maximization of expected utility. I argue that both of these proposals are flawed and develop an alternative line of response.
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I am indebted to J. C. Beall, Tyler Burge, Yin Chung, Philip Ebert, Mikkel Gerken, Patrick Greenough, Lars Bo Gundersen, Eline Busck Gundersen, Carrie Jenkins, Jesper Kallestrup, Michael Lynch, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Daniel Nolan, Duncan Pritchard, Marcus Rossberg, Robbie Williams, Crispin Wright, and Elia Zardini for helpful discussion.
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Pedersen, N.J. Entitlement, value and rationality. Synthese 171, 443–457 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9330-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9330-x