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Conditionals in reasoning

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Abstract

The paper presents a non-monotonic inference relation on a language containing a conditional that satisfies the Ramsey Test. The logic is a weakening of classical logic and preserves many of the ‘paradoxes of implication’ associated with the material implication. It is argued, however, that once one makes the proper distinction between supposing that something is the case and accepting that it is the case, these ‘paradoxes’ cease to be counterintuitive. A representation theorem is provided where conditionals are given a non-bivalent semantics and epistemic states are represented via preferential models.

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  1. Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

    John Cantwell

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  1. John Cantwell
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Cantwell, J. Conditionals in reasoning. Synthese 171, 47–75 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9379-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9379-6

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