Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The limits of conceivability: logical cognitivism and the language faculty

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Robert Hanna (Rationality and logic. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006) articulates and defends the thesis of logical cognitivism, the claim that human logical competence is grounded in a cognitive faculty (in Chomsky’s sense) that is not naturalistically explicable. This position is intended to steer us between the Scylla of logical Platonism and the Charybdis of logical naturalism (/psychologism). The paper argues that Hanna’s interpretation of Chomsky is mistaken. Read aright, Chomsky’s position offers a defensible version of naturalism, one Hanna may accept as far as his version of naturalism goes, although not one that supports the claim that cognitive science offers a place for logic that is somehow outside the natural, contingent order.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Anderson S., Lightfoot D. (2002) The language organ: Linguistics as cognitive physiology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Atlas J. (1989) Philosophy without ambiguity. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Benacerraf P. (1973) Mathematical truth. The Journal of Philosophy 70: 661–679 doi:10.2307/2025075

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boeckx C., Piatelli-Palmarini M. (2005) Language as a natural object, linguistics as a natural science. Linguistic Review 22: 351–370 doi:10.1515/tlir.2005.22.2-4.447

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bresnan J. (1978) A realistic transformational grammar. In: Halle M., Bresnan J., Miller G. (eds) Linguistic theory and psychological reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 1–59

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge T. (1979) Individualism and the mental. In: French P., Uehling Jr.T., Wettstein H. (eds) Midwest studies in philosophy IV: Studies in metaphysics. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 73–121

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers D. (1996) The conscious mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Cherniak C. (1986) Minimal rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N. (1959). Review of B. F. Skinner’s verbal behaviour. Language, 35, 26–58. doi:10.2307/411334 [References to the reprint in Fodor, J., & Katz, J. (Eds.) (1964). The structure of language: Readings n the philosophy of language (pp. 547–578). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall].

  • Chomsky N. (1965) Aspects of the theory of syntax. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1966) Cartesian linguistics: A chapter in the history of rationalist thought. Harper and Row, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1968) Language and mind (enlarged edition). Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1975) Reflections on language. Fontana, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1979) Human language and other semiotic systems. Semiotica 25: 31–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1980) Rules and representations. Columbia University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1986) Knowledge of language: Its nature, origin and use. Praeger, Westport

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1988) Language and the problem of knowledge: The Managua lectures. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (1993) Language and thought. Moyer Bell, Wakefield

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (2000) New horizons in the study of language and mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (2000) Linguistics and brain sciences. In: Marantz A., Miyashita Y., O’Neil W. (eds) Image, language, brain. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 13–28

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (2000) Minimalist inquiries: The framework. In: Martin R., Michaels D., Uriagereka J. (eds) Step by step: Essays on minimalist syntax in honor of Howard Lasnik. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 89–155

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (2003) Reply to Lycan. In: Antony L.M., Hornstein N. (eds) Chomsky and his critics. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 255–263

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (2003) Reply to Rey. In: Antony L.M., Hornstein N. (eds) Chomsky and his critics. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 274–287

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (2003) Reply to Gopnik. In: Antony L.M., Hornstein N. (eds) Chomsky and his critics. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 316–325

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N. (2004) Language and mind: Current thoughts on ancient problems. In: Jenkins L. (eds) Variation and universals in biolinguistics. Elsevier, Oxford, pp 379–406

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky, N. (2005). Three factors in language design. Linguistic Inquiry, 36 (pp. 1–22). doi:10.1162/0024389052993655.

  • Chomsky N. (2007) Approaching UG from below. In: Sauerland U., Gärtner H.-M. (eds) Interfaces + recursion = language?. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp 1–30

    Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N., Stemmer B. (1999) An online interview with Noam Chomsky: On the nature of pragmatics and related issues. Brain and Language, 68: 393–401 doi:10.1006/brln.1999.2119

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chomsky N., Cela-Conde C.J., Marty G. (1998) Noam Chomsky’s minimalist program and the philosophy of mind. An interview. Syntax 1: 19–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Collins J. (2004) Faculty disputes. Mind & Language 17: 300–333

    Google Scholar 

  • Collins J. (2005) Nativism: In defence of a biological understanding. Philosophical Psychology 18: 157–177 doi:10.1080/09515080500169686

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Collins J. (2008) Chomsky: A guide for the perplexed. Continuum, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Crain S., Khlentzos D. (2008) Is logic innate?. Biolinguistics 2: 24–56

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson D. (1984) Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson D. (1985) Rational animals. In: Lepore E., McLaughlin B. (eds) Actions and events: Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 473–480

    Google Scholar 

  • Devitt M. (2006) Ignorance of language. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Egan F., Matthews R. (2006) Doing cognitive neuroscience: A third way. Synthese 153: 377–391 doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9098-9

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Epstein S.D. (2007) Physiological linguistics and some implications regarding disciplinary autonomy and unification. Mind & Language 22: 44–67 doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00299.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. (1975) The language of thought. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. (1981). The present status of the innateness controversy. In Representations: Philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science (pp. 257–316). Cambridge: MIT Press.

  • Fodor J. (1983) The modularity of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. (1987) Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. (1998) Concepts: Where cognitive science went wrong. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. (2000) The mind doesn’t work that way. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. (2001) Doing without What’s within? Fiona Cowie’s critique of nativism. Mind 110: 99–148 doi:10.1093/mind/110.437.99

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fodor J. (2003) Hume variations. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Gendler, T.S., Hawthorne J., (eds) (2002) Conceivability and possibility. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanna R. (2001) Kant and the foundations of analytical philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hanna R. (2006) Rationality and logic. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman G. (1986) Change in view: Principles of reasoning. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hauser M., Chomsky N., Fitch T. (2002) The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?. Science 298: 1569–1579 doi:10.1126/science.298.5598.1569

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hinzen W. (2006) Mind design and minimal syntax. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins L. (2000) Biolinguistics: Exploring the biology of language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Jenkins L. (eds) (2004) Variation and universals in biolinguistics. Elsevier, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Jerne N. (1985) The generative grammar of the immune system. Science 229: 1057–1059 doi:10.1126/science.4035345

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (eds) (2000) Choices, values and frames. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, I. (1783/2002). Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able come forward as a science. In H. Allison & P. Heath (Eds.), Theoretical philosophy after 1781 (pp. 29–169) (trans. by G. Hatfield). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Katz J. (1981) Language and other abstract objects. Blackwell, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim J. (1993) Supervenience and mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Ludlow P. (2002) LF and natural logic. In: Preyer G., Peter G. (eds) Logical form and language. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 132–168

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ‘meaning’. In Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers (Vol. 2, pp. 215–271). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Pylyshyn Z. (1984) Computation and cognition: Toward a foundation for cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Pylyshyn Z. (1991) Rules and representations: Chomsky and representational realism. In: Kasher A. (eds) The Chomskyan turn. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 231–251

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. (1935/1966). Truth by convention. In ways of paradox and other essays (pp. 77–106). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

  • Rey G. (1998) A naturalistic a priori. Philosophical Studies 92: 25–43 doi:10.1023/A:1017155400164

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Samuels R. (2002) Nativism in cognitive science. Mind & Language 17: 233–265 doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00197

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Segal G. (2000) A slim book about narrow content. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Soames S. (1984) Linguistics and psychology. Linguistics and Philosophy 7: 155–179 doi:10.1007/BF00630811

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stein E. (1996) Without good reason. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Weinberg S. (1993) Dreams of a final theory. Vintage Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Weinberg S. (2001) Facing up: Science and its cultural adversaries. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Philosophy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

    John Collins

Authors
  1. John Collins
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Collins.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Collins, J. The limits of conceivability: logical cognitivism and the language faculty. Synthese 171, 175–194 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9391-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9391-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation