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Models and fiction

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Abstract

Most scientific models are not physical objects, and this raises important questions. What sort of entity are models, what is truth in a model, and how do we learn about models? In this paper I argue that models share important aspects in common with literary fiction, and that therefore theories of fiction can be brought to bear on these questions. In particular, I argue that the pretence theory as developed by Walton (1990, Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts. Harvard University Press, Cambridge/MA) has the resources to answer these questions. I introduce this account, outline the answers that it offers, and develop a general picture of scientific modelling based on it.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK

    Roman Frigg

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  1. Roman Frigg
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Frigg, R. Models and fiction. Synthese 172, 251 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9505-0

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