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On the principle of intention agglomeration

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Abstract

In this article, I first elaborate and refine the Principle of Intention Agglomeration (PIA), which was introduced by Michael Bratman as “a natural constraint on intention”. According to the PIA, the intentions of a rational agent should be agglomerative. The proposed refinement of the PIA is not only in accordance with the spirit of Bratman’s planning theory of intention as well as consistency constraints for intentions rooted in the theory, but also reveals some deep rationales of practical rationality regarding resource-limited agents. Then I defend the PIA against various objections and counterexamples, showing that the refined PIA survives attacks based on both conceptual analyses and psychological considerations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, Guangdong, 510275, China

    Jing Zhu

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  1. Jing Zhu
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Correspondence to Jing Zhu.

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A much-shortened version, co-authored with Dingzhou Fei, is published in A meeting of the minds: Proceedings of the workshop on logic, rationality and interaction, Beijing, 2007, J. van Benthem, S. Ju, & F. Veltman (Eds.), pp. 339–344. London: College Publications.

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Zhu, J. On the principle of intention agglomeration. Synthese 175, 89–99 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9531-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9531-y

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