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The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view

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Abstract

In this paper I outline my conception of the epistemology of science, by reference to my published papers, showing how the ideas presented there fit together. In particular I discuss the aim of science, scientific progress, the nature of scientific evidence, the failings of empiricism, inference to the best (or only) explanation, and Kuhnian psychology of discovery. Throughout, I emphasize the significance of the concept of scientific knowledge.

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  1. The University of Bristol, Bristol, UK

    Alexander Bird

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  1. Alexander Bird
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Correspondence to Alexander Bird.

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Bird, A. The epistemology of science—a bird’s-eye view. Synthese 175 (Suppl 1), 5–16 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9740-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9740-4

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