Abstract
The standard economic theory of choice is extended to accommodate a particular form of akratic choice. The empirical content of the new theory is fully characterized. A characterization of revealed akratic choice, in terms of observable choice only, is also provided. These results are consistent with the viewpoint that akrasia is a concept that can be empirically substantiated.
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Sandroni, A. Akrasia, instincts and revealed preferences. Synthese 181 (Suppl 1), 1–17 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9761-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9761-z