Abstract
Franz Huber’s (2008a) attempt to unify inductivist and hypothetico-deductivist intuitions on confirmation by means of a single measure are examined and compared with previous work on the theory of verisimilitude or truthlikeness. The idea of connecting ‘the logic of confirmation’ with ‘the logic of acceptability’ is also critically discussed, and it is argued that ‘acceptability’ takes necessarily into account some pragmatic criteria, and that at least two normative senses of ‘acceptability’ must be distinguished: ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being allowed to accept’, and ‘acceptable’ in the sense of ‘being obliged to accept’. Lastly, some connections of confirmation theory with naturalism, intertheoretic reduction, and explanation vs. understanding are explored.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bovens L., Hartmann S. (2005) Why there cannot be a single probabilistic measure of coherence?. Synthese 63: 361–374
Christensen D. (1999) Measuring confirmation. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 437–461
de Regt H. (2009) The epistemic value of understanding. Philosophy of Science 76: 585–597
Dizadji-Bahmani F., Frigg R., Hartmann S. (2011) Confirmation and reduction: A Bayesian account. Synthese 179: 321–338
Dizadji-Bahmani, F., Frigg, R., & S. Hartmann (forthcoming). Who’s afraid of Nagelian reduction? Erkenntnis.
Donato X., Zamora Bonilla J. P. (2009) Credibility, idealisation, and model building. Erkenntnis 70: 101–118
Doolittle W. F. (2010) The attempt on the life of the Tree of Life: Science, philosophy and politics. Biology and Philosophy 25: 455–473
Hempel C. G., Oppenheim P. (1945) A definition of degree of confirmation. Philosophy of Science 12: 98–115
Huber F. (2008a) Assessing theories, Bayes style. Synthese 161: 89–118
Huber F. (2008b) Hempel’s logic of confirmation. Philosophical Studies 139: 181–189
Kahn J., Landsburg S. E., Stockman A. C. (1996) The positive economics of methodology. The Journal of Economic Theory 68: 64–76
Kuipers T. A. F. (1992) Naive and refined truth approximation. Synthese 93: 299–341
Laudan L. (1981) A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science 48: 19–49
Maher P. (1993) Betting on theories. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nagel E. (1961) The structure of science. Routledge and Keagan Paul, London
Olsson E. J. (2002) What is the problem of coherence and truth?. The Journal of Philosophy 99: 246–278
Stanford P. K. (2006) Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Yuengert A. (2004) The boundaries of technique. Ordering positive and normative concerns in economic research. Lanham Lexington Books, Lanham
Zamora Bonilla J. P. (1996) Verisimilitude, structuralism and scientific progress. Erkenntnis 44: 25–47
Zamora Bonilla J. P. (2000) Truthlikeness, rationality and scientific method. Synthese 122: 321–335
Zamora Bonilla J.P. (2002a) Scientific inference and the pursuit of fame: A contractarian approach. Philosophy of Science 69: 300–323
Zamora Bonilla J. P. (2002b) Verisimilitude and the dynamics of scientific research programmes. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33: 349–368
Zamora Bonilla J. P. (2006a) Science studies and the theory of games. Perspectives on Science 14: 639–671
Zamora Bonilla J. P. (2006b) Rhetoric, induction, and the free speech dilemma. Philosophy of Science 73: 175–193
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zamora-Bonilla, J. Why are good theories good? reflections on epistemic values, confirmation, and formal epistemology. Synthese 190, 1533–1553 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9893-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9893-9