Abstract
According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.
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Montminy, M. The role of context in contextualism. Synthese 190, 2341–2366 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9975-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9975-8