Abstract
In this essay I shall focus on the adoption of the Semantic Approach by structural realists, including myself, who have done so on the grounds that it wears its structuralist sympathies on its sleeve (Ladyman Stud Hist Philos Sci 29:409–424, 1998). Despite this, the SA has been identified as standing in tension with the ontological commitments of the so-called ’ontic’ form of this view and so I shall explore that tension before discussing the usefulness of the SA in framing scientific representation and concluding with a discussion of the implications of the ontological status of theories and models themselves.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
However, whereas Suppe’s intention was to praise the SA, Halvorson’s is to damn it! For a response see van Fraassen (2014).
However, this point does not bite so hard, as it obviously depends on what one means by ‘in name only’. If that means, eliminates objects in a metaphysical sense but not in the everyday physicists’ sense of particle, then the advocate of OSR may cry ‘That’s good enough for me!’.
I’d like to thank one of the referees for pressing me on this.
One of the referees has suggested economics or mathematical decision theory. Unfortunately, I am not sufficiently familiar with these fields to offer a definite view on the nature of the theories involved; for discussion of theories and models in economics, see Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2014).
References
Azzouni, J., & Bueno, O. True Nominalism: Referring versus Coding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, forthcoming.
Baez, J. (2006). Quantum quandaries: A category-theoretic perspective. In D. Rickles, S. French, & J. Saatsi (Eds.), The structural foundations of quantum gravity (pp. 240–265). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bain, J. (2013). Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural realism. Synthese, 190, 1621–1635.
Brading, K., & Ryckmann, T. (2008). Hilbert?s “Foundations of Physics”: Gravitation and electromagnetism within the axiomatic method. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 39, 102–153.
Bueno, O., & Colyvan, M. (2011). An inferential conception of the application of mathematics. Nous, 45, 345–374.
Bueno, O., French, S., & Ladyman, J. (2002). On representing the relationship between the mathematical and the empirical’. Philosophy of Science, 69, 452–473.
Cameron, R. (2008a). There are no things that are musical works. British Journal of Aesthetics, 48, 295–314.
Cameron, R. (2008b). Truthmakers and ontological commitment. Philosophical Studies, 140, 1–18.
Cameron, R. (forthcoming). How to be a nominalist and a fictional realist. In: C. Mag Uidhir (Ed) Art and Abstract Objects Oxford: OUP.
Chakravartty, A. (2001). The semantic or model-theoretic view of theories and scientific realism. Synthese, 127, 325–345.
Da Costa, N., & French, S. (2003). Science and partial truth. New York: Oxford University Press.
Esfeld, M., & Lam, L. (2011). Ontic stuctural realism as a metaphysics of objects. In A. Bokulich & P. Bokulich (Eds.), Scientific structuralism. Boston studies in the philosophy of science. Dordrecht: Springer.
French, S. (2003). A model-theoretic account of representation. Philosophy of Science, 70, 1472–1483.
French, S. (2014). The structure of the world. Oxford: OUP.
French, S. (forthcoming), There Are No Such Things as Theories.
French, S., & Ladyman, J. (2003). Remodelling structural realism: Quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure: A reply to Cao. Synthese, 136, 31–56.
French, S., & Ladyman, J. (2011). In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism. In A. Bokulich & P. Bokulich (Eds.), Scientific structuralism (pp. 25–42). Dordrecth: Springer.
French, S., & Vickers, P. (2011). Are there no such things as theories? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, 771–804.
Frigg, R. (2010). Models and fictions. Synthese, 172, 251–268.
Frigg, R., & Hartmann, S. (2012). Models in Science The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/models-science/.
Giere, R. N. (1988). Explaining science: A cognitive approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giere, R. N. (2008). Models, metaphysics and methodology. In S. Hartmann, C. Hoefer, & L. Bovens (Eds.), Nancy cartwright’s philosophy of science (pp. 123–126). London: Routledge.
Halvorson, H. (2012). What scientific theories could not be. Philosophy of Science, 79, 183–206.
Kania, A. (2014). The Philosophy of Music. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/music/).
Kuorikoski, J., & Marchionni, C. (2014). The philosophy of economics. In S. French & J. Saatsi (Eds.), The bloomsbury companion to the philosophy of science (pp. 314–333). London: Bloomsbury.
Ladyman, J. (1998). What is structural realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 29, 409–424.
Ladyman, J. (2009). Scientific structuralism: On the identity and diversity of objects in a structure. The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81, 23–43.
Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Everything must go. London: Routledge.
Lal, R., & Teh, N. (forthcoming), Categorical Generalization and Physical Structuralism’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; available online: doi:10.1093/bjps/axv002.
Lam, L., & Wuthrich, C. (2014). No categorial support for radical ontic structural realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1093/bjps/axt053.
Landry, E. (2007). Shared structure need not be shared set-structure. Synthese, 158, 1–17.
Melia, J. (2000). Weaseling away the indispensability argument. Mind, 109, 455–479.
Nolan, D. (2011). Modal Fictionalism, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/fictionalism-modal/.
Popper, K. R. (1978). Three worlds: The tanner lectures on human values. Utah: University of Utah Press.
Psillos, S. (2001). Is structural realism possible? Philosophy of Science, 68, S13–S24.
Rosenberg, A. (forthcoming). Eliminativism without Tears.
Suppe, F. (Ed.). (1977). The structure of scientific theories. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Suppe, F. (1989). The semantic conception of theories and scientific realism. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Thomasson, A. (1999). Fiction and metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Thomasson, A. (2003). Fictional characters and literary practices. The British Journal of Aesthetics, 43, 138–157.
Thomasson, A. (2004). The ontology of art. In P. Kivy (Ed.), The blackwell guide to aesthetics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Thomson-Jones, M. (2006). Models and the semantic view. Philosophy of Science, 73, 524–535.
Toon, A. (2012). Models as make-believe. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and symmetry. Oxford: OUP.
van Fraassen, B. (2014). One or two gentle remarks about Hans Halvorson’s critique of the semantic view. Philosophy of Science, 81, 276–283.
Vickers, P. (2013). Understanding inconsistent science. Oxford: OUP.
Walton, K. (1990). Mimesis as make-believe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Weisberg, M. (2013). Simulation and similarity. Oxford: OUP.
Worrall, J., (1989). Structural realism: The best of both worlds? Dialectica, 43: 99–124. Reprinted in Papineau, D., (Ed.)., The Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 139–165.
Worrall, J. (2012). Miracles and structural realism. In E. Landry & D. Rickles (Eds.), Structural realism: Structure, object and causality (pp. 77–98). Dordrecht: Springer.
Wright, C. (1999). Truth: A traditional debate reviewed. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24, 31–74.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
French, S. (Structural) realism and its representational vehicles. Synthese 194, 3311–3326 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0879-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0879-x