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Causal powers and isomeric chemical kinds

  • S.I.: Causation in Metaphysics
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Abstract

Some philosophers have claimed that (natural) kinds can be construed as mereologically complex structural properties. This essay examines several strategies aimed at construing a certain class of natural kinds, namely isomeric chemical kinds, in accordance with this view. In particular, the essay examines views which posit structural proper parts in addition to micro-constitutive parts to individuate isomeric chemical kinds. It then goes on to argue that the phenomenon of chirality in stereochemistry gives the proponent of kinds-as-complex-properties evidence for positing the existence of causal-cum-dispositional individuating proper parts, in addition to structural parts, for chemical enantiomeric kinds.

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Notes

  1. The question of how one and the same universal can occur many times over is another notable objection that Lewis raises. Responding to this particular objection goes beyond the scope of the current essay, but others like Bennett (2013) and Wetzel (2009) have offered strong replies.

  2. See also Kalhat (2008) who discusses a similar strategy of positing arrangement universals as a way to reply to Lewis.

  3. I will not here delve into the extensive literature on these Leibniz’s Law–style arguments. Suffice it to say that there are a number of people who take up one or the other side of the debate.

  4. See for example Donnelly (2010), Effingham and Robson (2007), Forrest (2014), Gilmore (2007), Kleinschmidt (2011), and Smith (2009).

  5. As Koslicki (2008) and Simons (1987) both remark, WSP is the weakest supplementation principle that rules out models where there is an infinitely descending linear chain of objects all of whose proper parts are proper parts of its other proper parts, and those models where all an object’s proper parts overlap one another. In her defense, however, it should be noted that it is methodologically prudent to begin with the weakest supplementation principle that rules out unacceptable models; it’s just in this case, it looks like there’s independent evidence to look to alternatives.

  6. A referee points out that an alternative means of replying to the Lewis example is by appealing to facts about the method of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy. For example in Robinson et al. (2014, p. 141) in Fig. 3.16 we’re shown the predicted proton NRM spectrum for butane and isobutane. Notably, the referee points out, the spectroscopist treats these molecules as decomposable into hydrogen nuclei (i.e. protons) and everything else, and that there is a proton in isobutane markedly different. This may then serve to individuate the isobutane insofar as there really is something different about the causal powers of this particular methylene hydrogen constituent.

  7. Simons (1987) makes the claim that this claim is analytic insofar as it is tied to the meaning of the word ‘part’ (pp. 26–28). Another reason offered is that one requires a supplementation principle to distinguish proper parthood from other relations which are also strict partial orders.

  8. See Cahn et al. (1966).

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Acknowledgments

This paper began as a series of talks given in the 2013–2014 academic year presented at the University of Lausanne, the University of Ghent, and the workshop “Causation in the Metaphysics of Science: Natural Kinds and Individuals” held in March 2014 at the Institute of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne. Thanks to audience members for useful discussion.

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  1. Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, USA

    Andrew McFarland

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McFarland, A. Causal powers and isomeric chemical kinds. Synthese 195, 1441–1457 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1044-x

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