Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Mereological monism and Humean supervenience

  • S.I.: The Legacy of David Lewis
  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

According to Lewis, mereology is the general and exhaustive theory of ontological composition (mereological monism), and every contingent feature of the world supervenes upon some fundamental properties instantiated by minimal entities (Humean supervenience). A profound analogy can be drawn between these two basic contentions of his metaphysics, namely that both can be intended as a denial of emergentism. In this essay, we study the relationships between Humean supervenience and two philosophical spin-offs of mereological monism: the possibility of gunk and the thesis of composition as identity. In a gunky scenario, there are no atoms and, thus, some criteria alternative to mereological atomicity must be introduced in order to identify the bearers of fundamental properties; this introduction creates a precedent, which renders the restriction of the additional criteria to gunky scenarios arbitrary. On the other hand, composition as identity either extends the principle of indiscernibility of identicals to composition or is forced to replace indiscernibility with a surrogate; both alternatives lead to the postulation of a symmetric kind of supervenience which, in contrast to Humean supervenience, does not countenance a privileged level. Both gunk and composition as identity, thus, display a tension with Humean supervenience.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This label for Lewis’s contention has been introduced by Fine (1994, p. 138).

  2. The existence of a minimal level of exclusive bearers of fundamental properties is seen by many as incompatible with the scientific image of the world delivered by contemporary physics (Schaffer 2003; Hüttemann 2004; Maudlin 2007). The rejection of the mereological treatment of composition or its integration in a pluralistic approach is often motivated by the need to account for several alleged counterexamples to mereological principles (Koslicki 2008; Fine 2010), while other authors deflate the significance of the metaphysical controversies to which MM is an answer either because they would be “verbal disputes” (Hirsch 2005), or because the metaphysical concept of composition would play no role in contemporary science (Ross et al. 2007).

  3. McDaniel (2008) and Bayley (2011) are noteworthy exceptions. We will come back to McDaniel in n. 33. Bailey’s incompatibility claim involves the irreflexivity of grounding. Since the fundamentality claim we are going to confront with mereology involves supervenience and not grounding, we shall not discuss his work.

  4. Lewis never explicitly motivates MM, as remarked also by Forrest (1986).

  5. Goodman (1956).

  6. See Oliver (1993) for a development of this objection to Goodman’s so-called hyperextensionalism. See also Lewis (1991, pp. 38–41).

  7. Fine (2010).

  8. In this excerpt, Lewis qualifies the properties in the supervenience basis as “perfectly natural intrinsic.” Throughout the present paper we limit our attention to so-called “perfectly natural” or “fundamental” properties, and we use these two qualifications interchangeably. It should be noted, however, that naturalness for Lewis was a matter of degree: some properties are non-perfectly natural, but still natural; they fall outside the scope of this paper in so far as non-perfectly natural properties are not included in the basis for HS. It should also be noted that, according to Lewis, any fundamental property is intrinsic; this controversial tenet, however, is not directly pertinent to the matter under discussion here.

  9. The obliteration of structural features dictated by mereology is, at this stage of the analysis, relative to the identity conditions for complex entities. Mereology as such does not claim that structural arrangements are irrelevant in a complete description of the world or supervene upon the properties and relations of the parts. As we will see in Sect. 4, the commitment to supervenience claims is introduced when mereology is complemented with the thesis of composition as identity.

  10. See again Forrest (1986) on this point.

  11. See n. 2 for some bibliographical references.

  12. Cfr. (Lewis 1991) and (Lewis 1986a).

  13. Nonetheless, mereology has been sometimes interpreted as a theory of geometrical entities (see Tarski 1929) or integrated in more complex frameworks that are meant to cope with spatial extension, as in the case of mereotopology (see Casati and Varzi 1999).

  14. See for example Armstrong (1978) and Paul (2002). An analogous example could be easily built with tropes.

  15. An alternative strategy could resort to Armstrong’s distinction between thick and thin particulars (1997, pp. 123–126). A thick particular has its properties (meant as universals) as parts, while the thin one is connected to them only by instantiation. The Humean could take point-sized entities as thin particulars: they would be mereologically atomic bearers of fundamental properties.

  16. See for example, Zimmermann (1996), Schaffer (2003), and Arntzenius (2008).

  17. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the ambiguity between gunk and stuff here discussed.

  18. For a critical analysis of these roles of natural properties, see Borghini and Lando (2015).

  19. The possibility of gunk had been discussed in a similar vein by Sider (1993) against van Inwagen’s mereological quasi-nihilism (Van Inwagen 1994), according to which only atoms and what constitutes a life exist: if quasi-nihilism is unable to cope with the genuine possibility of gunk, its general adequacy as a restriction to composition is at risk. Sider later came to reject the hypothesis of gunk for independent reasons, see Sider (2011, p. 158).

  20. Lewis claims that this virtue is shared with trope theories and that it counts as an advantage over Armstrong’s and Forrest’s theories of structural universals.

  21. In this paper we do not discuss the hypothesis, defended in Schaffer (2010), that the universe is the only or primary bearer of natural/fundamental properties.

  22. According to some authors (Merricks 2005; Sider 2007; Bøhn 2014), CAI is also entrenched with a basic principle of mereology, namely unrestricted composition (the thesis that any choice of entities has a mereological fusion): after all if the fusion is nothing over and above its parts, then, if its parts exist, how could the fusion fail to exist? This connection, however, has been denied by other authors (cfr. McDaniel 2010; Cameron 2012).

  23. For alternative perspectives on the taxonomy of the versions of CAI, see Yi (1999), Sider (2007), and Wallace (2011a).

  24. Lewis (1991, p. 87). A similar contention about CAI and InId is expressed in Sider (2007) and Bricker (2015).

  25. Baxter (1988a, p. 206, 1988b). Baxter’s approach is developed and discussed by Turner (2014).

  26. For instance, in the theory of change, the rejection of InId would allow us to say that, when a flower changes its color, we have the very same object instantiating different (and even incompatible) properties.

  27. Wallace (2009, ch.3,Sect.5.1); see also Wallace (2011b). Hovda (2005), Bøhn (2014), and Cotnoir (2013) are other (and, in some cases, substantially different) attempts to extend InId to composition.

  28. It should be noted that InId is a principle about the properties of identical things, and as such cannot be applied directly to descriptions as linguistic devices. InId is not and does not yield a principle of substitutivity of co-referential terms, such that if P(j) and j \(=\) k, then P(k). Cartwright (1979) explains why the well-known counterexamples to the substitutivity of co-referential expressions should lead to the formulation of InId in terms of properties (and should not be taken to be counterexamples to InId).

  29. Since Lewis denies that a “generalized principle of indiscernibility” holds true for composition, we might suspect that the problem lies in the generality, and that the principle needs to be restricted: some properties differ between the fusion and its parts, while other properties—more basic and fundamental?—are perhaps common. But it is not clear how to operate such a restriction. Even the most canonical examples of fundamental properties make, at least prima facie, a fusion discernible from its parts, or vice versa.

  30. In reviewing Lewis’s alleged analogies between composition and identiy, Koslicki, too, writes that ease of description “seems to make use of a kind of supervenience thesis, according to which the characteristics of sums supervene on the characteristics of their parts.” (2008, p. 42) However, from our point of view, she fails to pinpoint the symmetry of the kind of supervenience involved.

  31. According to mereology, the one-one relation of parthood is transitive; but it is not clear how transitivity is to be applied in the case of the many-one relation of composition.

  32. The relation of being the same portion of reality possesses these features once CAI is accepted. Arguably, it would be circular to present these features as evidences in favor of CAI, since the suspicion would arise that the relation of being the same portion of reality is symmetric and transitive (and is in general a relation of equivalence) just because it “contains” identity, as the word “same” reveals. Here we are assuming that CAI—in Lewis’s version 1)—holds, and claiming that, as a result, there is an element of symmetry and transitivity in composition, as well as in standard one-one identity.

  33. McDaniel (2008) claims that CAI is incompatible with “strongly emergent properties.” Moreover, his analysis rests on an interpretation of Lewis’s remarks about ease of description. However, it seems to us that he fails to pinpoint the element of symmetry shared by InId and ease of description. As a result, he does not see that CAI is incompatible not only with emergent properties, but also with some kinds of multiple realizations (see below).

  34. These properties are sometimes called submergent, where ‘submergence’ is the converse of emergence. See Schaffer (2007, p. 187, n. 30).

  35. Block (1978) and Endicott (1993) defend the empirical plausibility of strong multiple realizations. By contrast, Bickle (1998, ch. 4) rejects them, due to reasons specific to the philosophy of mind.

  36. Schaffer (2003, pp. 510–511) discusses a boring kind of composition, but we use the term in a different way. Schaffer applies it to a gunky scenario where, under a fundamental level of bearers of natural properties, the smaller objects resulting from further divisions always have those same natural properties. These divisions are boring in the sense that, even if the analysis proceeds, no new property is ever found.

  37. For a discussion of the claim that supervenience is neither symmetric nor asymmetric by definition see Leuenberger (2008, Sect. 2.2) and McLaughlin and Bennett (2014, Sect. 3.2).

  38. A kind of primitivism about natural properties is discussed in Borghini and Lando (2015).

References

  • Armstrong, D. (1978). A theory of universals: Universals & scientific realism (Vol. II). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arntzenius, F. (2008). Gunk, topology, and measure. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 4, 225–247.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baxter, D. (1988a). Many-one identity (pp. 193–216). XVII: Philosophical Papers.

  • Baxter, D. (1988b). Identity in the loose and popular sense. Mind, 97, 575–582.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bayley, A. (2011). The incompatibility of composition as identity, priority pluralism, and irreflexive grounding. Analytic Philosophy, 52, 171–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bickle, J. (1998). Psychoneural reduction: The new wave. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Block, N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. In C. W. Savage (Ed.), Perception and cognition: Issues in the foundations of psychology. Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (Vol. 9, pp. 261–325). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

  • Bøhn, E. (2014). Unrestricted composition as identity. In D. Baxter & A. Cotnoir (Eds.), Composition as identity (pp. 143–165). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borghini, A., & Lando, G. (2015). Natural properties and atomicity in modal realism. Metaphysica, 16, 103–121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bricker, P. (2015). Composition as a kind of identity. Inquiry. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2015.1040447.

  • Cameron, R. (2012). Composition as identity doesn’t settle the special composition question. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 84, 531–554.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cartwright, R. (1979). Indiscernibility principles. Midwest Studies. Philosophy, 4, 293–306.

    Google Scholar 

  • Casati, R., & Varzi, A. (1999). Parts and places. The structures of spatial representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cotnoir, A. (2013). Composition as general identity. In K. Bennett & D. Zimmermann (Eds.), Oxford studies in metaphysics 8 (pp. 295–322). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Endicott, R. (1993). Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies. Erkenntnis, 38, 303–321.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, K. (1994). Compounds and aggregates. Noûs, 28, 137–158.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fine, K. (2010). Towards a theory of part. The Journal of Philosophy, 107, 559–589.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forrest, P. (1986). Neither magic nor mereology: A reply to Lewis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 89–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, N. (1956). A world of individuals. In I. M. Bochensky, A. Church, & N. Goodman (Eds.), The problem of universals: A symposium (pp. 13–31). Notre Dame, ID: University of Notre Dame Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirsch, E. (2005). Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes, and common sense. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70, 67–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hovda, P. (2005). Two defenses of composition as identity. http://people.reed.edu/ hovdap/TwoDefenses.ps

  • Hüttemann, A. (2004). What’s wrong with microphysicalism?. Oxford: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koslicki, K. (2008). The structure of objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laycock, H. (2006). Words without objects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leuenberger, S. (2008). Supervenience in metaphysics. Philosophy. Compass, 3, 749–762.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1983). New work for a theory of universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61, 343–377.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986a). Against structural universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64, 25–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986b). Philosophical papers II. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1991). Parts of classes. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1994). Humean supervenience debugged. Mind, 103, 473–490.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowe, J. (1998). The possibility of metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maudlin, T. (2007). The metaphysics within physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDaniel, K. (2008). Against composition as identity. Analysis, 68, 128–133.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDaniel, K. (2010). Composition as identity does not entail universalism. Erkenntnis, 73, 97–100.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKay, T. J. (2015). Stuff and coincidence. Philosophical Studies, 172, 3081–3100.

    Google Scholar 

  • McKay, T. J. (2016). Mass and plural. In M. Carrara, A. Arapinis, & F. Moltmann (Eds.), Plurality and unity. Logic, philosophy, and linguistics (pp. 171–193). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • McLaughlin, B., & Bennett, K. (2014). Supervenience. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/supervenience/

  • Merricks, T. (2005). Composition and vagueness. Mind, 114, 615–637.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oliver, A. (1993). Classes and Goodman’s nominalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93, 179–191.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paul, L. (2002). Logical parts. Noûs, 36, 578–596.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, D., Ladyman, J., & Spurrett, D. (2007). In defence of scientism. In J. Ladyman & D. Ross (Eds.), Every thing must go: Metaphysics naturalized (pp. 1–65). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, J. (2003). Is there a fundamental level? Noûs, 37, 498–517.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, J. (2007). From nihilism to monism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 85, 175–191.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The priority of the whole. Philosophical Review, 119, 31–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (1993). Van Inwagen and the possibility of gunk. Analysis, 53, 285–289.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2007). Parthood. Philosophical Review, 116, 51–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tarski, A. (1929). Foundations of the geometry of solids. In A. Tarski (Ed.), Logic, semantics, metamathematics. Papers from 1923 to 1938 (Vol. 1956, pp. 24–29). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Turner, J. (2014). Donald Baxter’s composition as identity. In D. Baxter & A. Cotnoir (Eds.), Composition as identity (pp. 225–243). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen, P. (1994). Composition as identity. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 207–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallace, M. (2009). Composition as Identity. PhD Dissertation. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallace, M. (2011a). Composition as identity: Part 1. Philosophy Compass, 6, 804–816.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wallace, M. (2011b). Composition as identity: Part 2. Philosophy Compass, 6, 817–827.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yi, B. (1999). Is mereology ontologically innocent? Philosophical Studies, 93, 141–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimmermann, D. (1996). Could extended objects be made out of simple parts? An argument for ‘atomless gunk’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56, 1–29.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

Writing of this article spanned over five years. Earliest versions were presented at a philosophical colloquium held in December 2010 in Zagreb, and at a conference on Lewis’s philosophical legacy held in June 2011 in Urbino. We are thankful to those who provided comments in those occasions, to a number of anonymous or solicited readers; among them, we owe special gratitude to John Divers, Carolyn Richardson, Jonathan Schaffer, and Achille Varzi.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, College of the Holy Cross, 1 College Street, Worcester, MA, 01610, USA

    Andrea Borghini

  2. Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri 7, 56126, Pisa, PI, Italy

    Giorgio Lando

Authors
  1. Andrea Borghini
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Giorgio Lando
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Andrea Borghini.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Borghini, A., Lando, G. Mereological monism and Humean supervenience. Synthese 197, 4745–4765 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1048-6

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1048-6

Keywords

Search

Navigation