Abstract
Materialism—the view that all of reality is wholly determined by the very, very small—and extreme nominalism—the view that properties, kinds, and qualities do not really exist—have been the dominant view in analytic philosophy for the last 100 years or so. Both views, however, have failed to provide adequate accounts for the possibility of intentionality and of knowledge. We must therefore look to alternatives. One well-tested alternative, the hylomorphism of Aristotle and the medieval scholastics, was rejected without being refuted and so deserves further examination. I will argue that Aristotelian hylomorphic provides a markedly superior account of knowledge, cognitive normativity, and intentionality.
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Notes
As will be clear below, by ‘hylomorphism’ I mean what I have called ‘staunch hylomorphism’ (Koons 2014), as opposed to the ‘faint-hearted’ hylomorphism represented by the work of Fine (1999), Johnston (2006), and Koslicki (2008), and discussed by Williams (1986). My fellow staunch hylomorphists include Scaltsas (1994), Rea (2011), Marmodoro (2013), and Jaworski (2016). Staunch hylomorphism combines a sparse theory of fundamental entities and material composition, a sparse theory of properties, and a robustly non-Humean theory of causal powers.
The form of grounding that I have in mind follows closely the work of Fine (2012) and Rosen (2010). On these views, grounding is fundamentally a relation between facts. I will also assume that the existence of the grounding fact necessitates what it grounds, and that grounding is an asymmetric relation.
I also argued in Koons (2000) that materialism cannot explain the reliability of our inferences to the simplest or most elegant hypothesis in fundamental physics, since materialism excludes the possibility that such simplicity is a non-accidental, projectible feature of the laws.
Millikan (1984, p. 28). Millikan’s actual definition requires that C be a “Normal” or reproductively established characteristic of R. Instead of requiring that C be positively correlated in R with the function F, she requires only that the positive correlation hold in some set S which includes x’s ancestors, together with “other things not having C.” Her exact wording of clause (3) is:
One among the legitimate explanations that can be given of the fact that x exists makes reference to the fact that C correlated positively with F [i.e., the function of producing E in circumstances I] over S, either directly causing reproduction of x or explaining why R was proliferated and hence why x exists.
None of these variations would make any difference to our objection.
From “Criticism on ‘The Origin of Species”’, Natural History Review, 1864, p. 7.
In a recent article (Koons 2014), I have developed an account of how such fundamental causal powers of composite substances could be realized in a world like ours.
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I gratefully acknowledge with the support given me during the 2014–2015 academic year by the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University, and by the University Research Institute at the University of Texas at Austin.
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Koons, R.C. The ontological and epistemological superiority of hylomorphism. Synthese 198 (Suppl 3), 885–903 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1295-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1295-6