Abstract
According to a prominent account of knowledge-how, knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. A related view has it that to know how to perform an action is for it to seem to one that a way to perform that action is in fact a way to do so. According to a further view, knowledge-how is a species of objectual knowledge. Each of these intellectualist views has significant virtues including, notably, the ability to account for the seemingly epistemic dimensions of knowledge-how. However, while intellectualist views can account for the seemingly epistemic dimensions of knowledge-how, such views have difficulty accounting for the practical dimensions of knowledge-how. The objection I level against existing intellectualist views here seizes on this deficiency. I argue that, in virtue of the practical dimensions of knowledge-how, propositional knowledge under a practical mode of presentation is not sufficient for knowledge-how. Even when the sufficiency conditions for knowledge-how set out by extant intellectualist views are met, one may fail to know how to perform an action in virtue of a disposition to act on a false belief about a way for one to perform that action. Thus, whereas critics of intellectualist views often allege that such views place overly demanding conditions on knowledge-how, the objection developed here suggests that existing intellectualist views place insufficiently demanding conditions on knowledge-how.
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Notes
Following Bengson and Moffett (2011b, fn. 3) I take “in virtue of” to denote full or partial grounding.
For a classic discussion of such cases, see Perry (1979).
Just as one might stand in an objectual understanding relation in virtue of one’s propositional attitudes, without that relation being a propositional attitude relation, one might stand in a behavioral-disposition relation—a disposition to succeed in φ-ing when one tries, for instance—without that relation being a propositional attitude relation.
To my knowledge, no philosopher has explicitly endorsed a dispositionalist intellectualist account of knowledge-how. Markie (2015) comes the closest, noting that, at least on the construal of intellectualism utilized in this paper, his Special Ability View of knowledge-how is both intellectualist and dispositionalist (fn. 3). While inconsistent use of terminology precludes straightforward classification of views about knowledge-how, several other philosophers have recently made remarks at least suggestive of a dispositionalist intellectualist view. For instance, Löwenstein (2017) explicitly rejects intellectualism, but his own Rylean Responsibilist View has it that knowledge-how is an ability that depends, in some way, on the subject’s propositional knowledge. Waights Hickman (2018) suggests the plausibility of such a view. Likewise, Habgood-Coote’s (2018) Interrogative Capacity View identifies knowledge-how with the capacity to answer questions—a capacity grounded in propositional knowledge. Habgood-Coote’s view thus appears to be a sort of dispositionalist intellectualism, as presently construed. Finally, Constantin’s (2018) Dispositional Theory of Practical Knowledge treats knowledge-how as a disposition to have an ability that is realized in seeming states of the sort emphasized by Cath (2011). Thus, while Constantin explicitly rejects intellectualism as he understands it, Constantin’s view appears to be a sort of dispositional intellectualism, as this position is understood here.
This case is modified from one offered by Hawley (2003).
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this possibility.
As Fridland (2014, p. 2742) emphasizes, the ability to voluntarily commit errors in a performative domain is a mark of skill in that domain.
My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for recommending that I consider Brownstein and Michaelson’s discussion of these cases.
To start, the success of the argument depends on the assumption that players interpret the advice to “watch the ball” or “keep their eyes on the ball” to mean they should visually track the ball from its release to the point where it contacts the bat. That players interpret the advice in this way is not obvious, however, and Brownstein and Michaelson offer only anecdotal evidence to suggest the advice is interpreted in this way (2016, fn. 18). Second, Brownstein and Michaelson only speculate that players would deny that they hit balls the way they do—that is, by watching the ball long enough to assess its trajectory, then making “an anticipatory saccade” to the point at which they expect it to reach the plate (2016, p. 2822). Third, even if players do explicitly deny batting the way they do, this may simply be because players fail to recognize some descriptions—those involving the term “anticipatory saccade,” for instance—of the way they bat. Finally, it is not clear that Brownstein and Michaelson present adequate reason to deny that batters have implicit propositional knowledge regarding ways for them to bat. Because it is possible that the players’ knowledge-how might be grounded in implicit propositional knowledge, the authors present their conclusion only speculatively, albeit while expressing skepticism as to the availability of an account of implicit belief of the right sort to defend Knowledge PI.
Some of these difficulties are absent from Brownstein and Michaelson’s discussion of knowledge-how to catch a ball. The authors present evidence from Reed et al. (2010) that individuals that clearly know how to catch a ball both endorse faulty ways of doing so and explicitly deny that they utilize the way in which they in fact catch (Brownstein and Michaelson 2016, p. 2823). In short, even individuals with skill and experience misdescribe the way in which they catch balls. It is difficult to interpret these individuals’ testimony as anything other than the endorsement of a false belief about how to catch fly balls. Moreover, given the relative simplicity of the true and false explanations of how they catch, there is little reason to suppose that the subjects’ denial of the true explanation is merely due to unfamiliarity with the description of the actual way of catching. Still, the possibility that the individuals have implicit knowledge of a way to catch is enough to ensure that the case of knowledge-how to catch is not decisive evidence against Knowledge PI.
George (2013) likewise argues that knowledge-wh is inconsistent with relevant false beliefs. George’s argument for this point differs from the one offered here, insofar as George does not emphasize the practical element of knowledge-wh.
To be clear, I take it that, prior to realizing that she cannot vote at the primary school, Bethany does not know where to vote. Arguably, she gains this knowledge-where once she realizes that she cannot vote at the primary school. At that point, Bethany is arguably in a position similar to that of an amputee former cyclist or a handless former pianist—she possesses knowledge-where despite the inability—due to unfavorable external circumstances—to put it into action.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to Farkas’ discussion of the practical aspects of knowledge-wh.
One way of explaining why is as follows. Danny ought to know that if Gary Johnson is president, then Donald Trump is not president. There is thus a normative defeater for her propositional knowledge.
Cath (2017), for instance, offers reason to be skeptical that the sort of propositional knowledge that defenders of Knowledge PI take to underlie knowledge-how can be transmitted via testimony. Cath’s point is that speakers will often fail to know, of any way, that that way is a way for the hearer to perform a certain action. Consequently, speakers will often be unable to transmit the relevant sort of propositional knowledge via testimony. I concur with Cath’s point as far as it goes, but it bears noting that speakers will sometimes have the relevant knowledge. Moreover, as I indicate here, the objection I raise against existing intellectualist views would go through even if the relevant sort of propositional knowledge could never be transmitted via testimony.
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Peter Markie for his thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank several anonymous referees for their feedback, which resulted in considerable improvements to this paper.
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Harris, K. Knowledge-how and false belief. Synthese 198, 1845–1861 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02172-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02172-2