Abstract
Some interdomain traffic needs specific guarantees in terms of QoS. Hence, an end-to-end QoS provisioning should be maintained by transit Autonomous Systems and final destinations proposing the services. We propose a distributed stock model following a reverse cascade negotiation in order to enable QoS provisioning at the interdomain level. We analyze different stock strategies on a simple network topology using game theory framework and validate our results by simulation.
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Barth, D., Echabbi, L. & Hamlaoui, C. Stock provisioning strategies for QoS at the interdomain level. Telecommun Syst 52, 623–632 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-011-9506-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-011-9506-4