Abstract
Flow control is one typical resource management tool. Its objectives are to adjust the traffic in the network, and resolve data traffic congestion, maximize the utilization of available bandwidth resource and realize fairness among different sources. Taking more consideration on the interaction and the dynamic characteristics of the flow, in this paper, we propose a cooperative differential game of flow control. Our goal is to assign sources with appropriate transmission rate levels so as to the queue length in the bottleneck link is optimal for the network performance and their benefits are maximal. We derive a payment distribution mechanism that would constitute a time-consistent solution and guarantee individual rationality.
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Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank the editors and anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments. This work is supported by the Foundation for Key Program of Ministry of Education, P. R. China (No. 311007), and the National Science Foundation Project of P. R. China (61202079, 61170014 and 61072039).
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Appendix 1
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof
Assume that \(V^{i}(q_l )\) is a polynomial with respect to the state variable \(q_l\). In line with Eqs. (6) and (7), we assume that
\(\square \)
Substituting the results from (7) and (20) into (6), and upon solving (6) yields:
For the above two equations to hold, we have that
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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Cheng, ZM., Zhou, XW., Ding, Y. et al. A Cooperative Differential Game Model for Multiuser Rate-Based Flow Control. Wireless Pers Commun 72, 1173–1186 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-013-1072-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-013-1072-5