Abstract
In order to find the screening mechanism of port enterprises value chain routines, based on describing the selection of port enterprises value chain routines, an evolutionary game model is presented and constructed. Using this model, we analyze the strategy of port enterprises value chain routines when they achieve the stability of the evolution. The results show that port enterprise value chain routine selection is a dynamic and repeated game. The expected revenue and convention cost of routines taking part in the game playing directly correlate with the evolutionary stable strategy and the selection of port enterprises value chain routines tend to be conservative strategy. Introducing evolutionary game theory provides a new perspective for the study on the formation, search and selection of port enterprises value chain routines and provides favorable theoretical support for further research in related fields.
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank professors who give the valuable comments and constructive suggestions, which have greatly improved the quality of this paper. This research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation for young scholars of China (71503029), Social Science Foundation of Liaoning (L13DJY055) and the Special Foundation for Connotative Development of Liaoning Higher Education (20110116203).
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Han, B., Zhang, P., Kuang, H. et al. Screening of Port Enterprise Value Chain Routines Based on Evolution Equilibrium. Wireless Pers Commun 102, 861–878 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-017-5110-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-017-5110-6