Abstract
A GPS spoofing attack broadcasts counterfeit signals to resemble standard GPS satellite signals to take control of the correlation peaks of GPS signals to force the victim receiver to estimate a false position. The proposed approach is based on an intelligent dynamic algorithm focusing on distinguishing authentic and counterfeit signals. This paper presents a method based on the Imperialist Competitive Algorithm to investigate correlation peaks of authentic and counterfeit signals. In this method, a feature vector is derived from the correlation function. When the spoofing signal tries to take control of the tracking loop, the feature values deviate. Accordingly, the cluster size of the spoofing signal increases until it becomes equal to or greater than the authentic signal size, and thus, the spoofing signal is detected. The performance of the presented detection approach is validated through simulations on real data. It reveals that the proposed method can detect spoofing attacks in 99.7% of cases.









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Abbreviations
- C:
-
Center of the empire
- d:
-
GPS data bit
- D:
-
Doppler frequency
- E:
-
Early
- f:
-
Frequency
- F:
-
Objective function
- I:
-
In phase
- L:
-
Late
- N:
-
Coherent integration interval
- n:
-
Number of sample
- P:
-
Prompt
- p:
-
Signal power
- R:
-
Correlation function
- r:
-
Received GPS signals
- T:
-
Sampling interval
- t:
-
Time
- T.C:
-
Total cost
- \(\upsilon\) :
-
Complex correlated output
- w:
-
Length of window
- X:
-
Country
- x:
-
Random colony
- Y:
-
Feature vector
- τ:
-
Time delay
- η:
-
Adaptive white Gaussian noise
- \(\Delta\) :
-
Differentiation
- λ:
-
Distance between the centres of empires
- \(\updelta\) :
-
Doppler frequency deviation
- \(\Gamma\) :
-
Normalized cost
- \(\upxi\) :
-
Number between zero and one
- φ:
-
Phase
- θ:
-
Uniform random number
- β:
-
Positive constants
- μ:
-
Positive constants
- \(\Delta\)ω:
-
Public utility movement
- i:
-
Ith pseudo-random noise (PRN) code
- d:
-
Doppler
- imp:
-
Imperialist
- IF:
-
Intermediate frequency
- MV:
-
Moving variance
- pop:
-
Population
- p:
-
Prompt branch of correlator's output
- s:
-
Sample
- A:
-
Authentic signals
- min:
-
Lower limit
- S:
-
Spoofing signals
- max:
-
Upper limit
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Shafiee, E., Mosavi, M.R. & Moazedi, M. A Modified Imperialist Competitive Algorithm for Spoofing Attack Detection in Single-Frequency GPS Receivers. Wireless Pers Commun 119, 919–940 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-021-08244-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11277-021-08244-2