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Related-Key Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced-Round LBlock

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Abstract

LBlock is a 32-round lightweight block cipher with 64-bit block size and 80-bit key. This paper identifies 16-round related-key impossible differentials of LBlock, which are better than the 15-round related-key impossible differentials used in the previous attack. Based on these 16-round related-key impossible differentials, we can attack 23 rounds of LBlock while the previous related-key impossible differential attacks could only work on 22-round LBlock. This makes our attack on LBlock the best attack in terms of the number of attacked rounds.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Long Wen, Mei-Qin Wang & Jing-Yuan Zhao

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  1. Long Wen
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  2. Mei-Qin Wang
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  3. Jing-Yuan Zhao
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mei-Qin Wang.

Additional information

This work has been supported by the National Basic Research 973 Program of China under Grant No. 2013CB834205, the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61133013, 61070244, and 61103237, the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University of China under Grant No. NCET-13-0350, as well as the Interdisciplinary Research Foundation of Shandong University of China under Grant No. 2012JC018.

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Wen, L., Wang, MQ. & Zhao, JY. Related-Key Impossible Differential Attack on Reduced-Round LBlock. J. Comput. Sci. Technol. 29, 165–176 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-014-1419-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-014-1419-8

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