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A Two-Player Coalition Cooperative Scheme for the Bodyguard Allocation Problem

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Abstract

We address the bodyguard allocation problem (BAP), an optimization problem that illustrates the conflict of interest between two classes of processes with contradictory preferences within a distributed system. While a class of processes prefers to minimize its distance to a particular process called the root, the other class prefers to maximize it; at the same time, all the processes seek to build a communication spanning tree with the maximum social welfare. The two state-of-the-art algorithms for this problem always guarantee the generation of a spanning tree that satisfies a condition of Nash equilibrium in the system; however, such a tree does not necessarily produce the maximum social welfare. In this paper, we propose a two-player coalition cooperative scheme for BAP, which allows some processes to perturb or break a Nash equilibrium to find another one with a better social welfare. By using this cooperative scheme, we propose a new algorithm called FFC-BAPS for BAP. We present both theoretical and empirical analyses which show that this algorithm produces better quality approximate solutions than former algorithms for BAP.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, Center for Scientific Research and Higher Education of Ensenada, Ensenada, BC, 22860, Mexico

    José Alberto Fernández-Zepeda, Daniel Brubeck-Salcedo & Héctor Zatarain-Aceves

  2. Department of Systems and Computation, Instituto Technológico de Ciudad Guzmán, Guzmán, JAL, 49100, Mexico

    Daniel Fajardo-Delgado

Authors
  1. José Alberto Fernández-Zepeda
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  2. Daniel Brubeck-Salcedo
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  3. Daniel Fajardo-Delgado
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  4. Héctor Zatarain-Aceves
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to José Alberto Fernández-Zepeda.

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Fernández-Zepeda, J.A., Brubeck-Salcedo, D., Fajardo-Delgado, D. et al. A Two-Player Coalition Cooperative Scheme for the Bodyguard Allocation Problem. J. Comput. Sci. Technol. 33, 823–837 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-018-1858-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11390-018-1858-8

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