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Stability of International Environmental Agreements in leadership model*

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Abstract

International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) are a form of cooperation ratified by countries which can improve the management of shared environmental resources. The authors analyze the stability of International Environmental Agreements in leadership model. In 2006, Diamantoudi & Sartzetakis found that a stable coalition consists of either 2, 3, or 4 members if the number of countries is greater than 4. Their model is reconsidered. It is shown that the size of stable IEAs decreases from 3 to 2 when the total number of countries involved increases. However, a situation that can guarantee 4 to be the size of stable IEAs could not be found.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, H3A 2T7, Canada

    Jin ZHANG

  2. School of Management, Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100080, China

    Shouyang WANG & Lei ZU

Authors
  1. Jin ZHANG
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  2. Shouyang WANG
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  3. Lei ZU
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Correspondence to Jin ZHANG.

Additional information

*The research is supported by Centre interuniversitaire de RECHERCHE en economie quantitative (CIREQ).

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ZHANG, J., WANG, S. & ZU, L. Stability of International Environmental Agreements in leadership model*. J Syst Sci Complex 21, 184–190 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-008-9102-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-008-9102-1

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