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A selfish routing based network improvement problem

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Abstract

This paper considers a selfish routing based network improvement problem, in which the authors would like to find a modified latency function that results in a new Nash equilibrium flow satisfying all traffic demands subject to the target capacity, while the total modification cost on edge latency is minimized. By using the reduction from the 3-Satisfiability (3-SAT) problem to our problem, the authors show that this problem is strongly NP-hard, even for the single commodity network.

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Correspondence to Binwu Zhang.

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The work is supported Hohai University Funds under Grant Nos. XZX/08B002-02, 2009428211, and the US National Science Foundation under Grant No. DMI-0553310.

This paper was recommended for publication by Editor Shouyang WANG.

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Zhang, B., Fang, SC. A selfish routing based network improvement problem. J Syst Sci Complex 24, 68–78 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-011-8156-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-011-8156-7

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