Abstract
The present study discusses the relationships between two independently developed models of games with incomplete information, hypergames (Bennett, 1977) and Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1967). The authors first show that any hypergame can naturally be reformulated in terms of Bayesian games in an unified way. The transformation procedure is called Bayesian representation of hypergame. The authors then prove that some equilibrium concepts defined for hypergames are in a sense equivalent to those for Bayesian games. Furthermore, the authors discuss carefully based on the proposed analysis how each model should be used according to the analyzer’s purpose.
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This research was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Fellows, No. 21-9482.
This paper was recommended for publication by Editor Shouyang WANG.
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Sasaki, Y., Kijima, K. Hypergames and bayesian games: A theoretical comparison of the models of games with incomplete information. J Syst Sci Complex 25, 720–735 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-012-1074-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-012-1074-5