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Bounding the inefficiency of the C-logit stochastic user equilibrium assignment

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Abstract

Compared with standard logit-based stochastic user equilibrium assignment model, the C-logit model describes route choice behavior in a more realistic way by considering the overlapping effect between routes. This paper investigates the inefficiency upper bounds of this model against the deterministic system optimum and the C-logit stochastic system optimum in terms of the total network travel time. It is found that the commonality factor of overlapping routes significantly affects the inefficiency bound, besides link congestion degree, total demand and the number of feasible routes. If the commonality factor is not considered, the efficiency loss resulting from selfishly stochastic travel behavior will be to large extent underestimated.

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Correspondence to Tianliang Liu.

Additional information

The research was supported by the National Basic Research Program of China under Grant No. 2012CB725401, the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71271001 and 71401083, and the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University under Grant No. NCET-13-0025.

This paper was recommended for publication by Editor ZHANG Xun.

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Yong, G., Huang, H., Liu, T. et al. Bounding the inefficiency of the C-logit stochastic user equilibrium assignment. J Syst Sci Complex 29, 1629–1649 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-016-4320-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-016-4320-4

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