Abstract
Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS (first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the marginal effect of extra-gain guilty fairness concerns of supply chain members on the contract design, supply chain’s profit and profit distribution. When the supplier considers distributional fairness of loss aversion and extra-gain guilty, extra-gain guilty concern reduces the optimal wholesale and retail price, and improves supply chain performance. When the first or the second retailer considers distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness, extra-gain guilty concerns decrease the optimal wholesale and retail price but increase the profit of all supply chain members only when the level of loss aversion is large enough and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2. However, when the level of loss aversion is small and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2, extra-gain guilty has no influence on supply chain performance. The analysis reveals that the supply chain performance can be further improved by considering fairness of extra-gain guilty.
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This research was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 71571079, 71301122, 71671133, 71131004, and Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University under Grant No. NCET-13-0228.
This paper was recommended for publication by Editor LI Jian.
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Li, J., Fan, X. & Dai, B. Fairness of extra-gain guilty in performance of supply chain and contract design. J Syst Sci Complex 30, 866–882 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-017-5133-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11424-017-5133-9