Skip to main content
Log in

Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Optimization Letters Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We consider two simultaneous, private value, second-price auctions with identical objects for sale and two types of bidders, strong and weak, in the sense of hazard rate stochastic dominance. We show that if the strong bidders are not too strong with respect to the weak bidders, then, by setting an appropriate reserve price, a separating equilibrium exists in which strong bidders will participate in the auction with only strong bidders, and weak bidders will participate in the auction with only weak bidders.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
$34.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or eBook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The “authorities” refer to government and public sector auctioneers.

  2. Weak bidders in Janssen’s [9] case would be considered firms without proper infrastructure (newcomers) and strong bidders would be firms with proper infrastructure (incumbents).

  3. Note that there is no restriction on n and m.

  4. Observe that since the strategy sets are finite, the standard existence theorem ensures that Nash equilibria exist but not necessarily in pure strategies, which is the separation form we are seeking (Klemperer [10]).

  5. The expected payoff is \(\int _{s_{j}}^{v}P^{j}(t)dt\) only if \(v\ge s_{j}\). Otherwise, it is zero.

  6. Observe that once a bidder learns his or her valuation, the title “strong” or “weak” is irrelevant.

  7. Observe that in equilibrium \(P^{j}(v),j=I,II\) is \( F_{s}^{n-1}(v),F_{w}^{m-1}(v),\) if strong bidders participate in auction I and weak bidders take part in auction II respectively. If a weak bidder deviates from this equilibrium and participates in auction I, the probability that s/he will win is \(P^{1}(v)=F_{s}^{n}(v)\). Similarly, if a strong bidder deviates from this equilibrium and participates in auction II, the probability that s/he will win is \(P^{2}(v)=F_{w}^{m}(v)\).

  8. Since \(\frac{\partial H_{s}(x,y_{I})}{\partial y_{I}}\ne 0\) and \(\frac{ \partial H_{w}(x,y_{II})}{\partial y_{II}}\ne 0\), the implicit function theorem holds and thus, there is a continuously differentiable solution \( y_{I}(x),y_{II}(x)\) to (3) and (4).

  9. Observe that \(y_{I}(x)\) and \(y_{II}(x)\) are continuously differentiable by the implicit function theorem.

  10. Note that in the case of \(x=1\) the equality (3) will hold only if \(\int _{y_{I}}^{1}F_{w}^{m}(v)(1-F_{s}(v))dv\) =0, and it will be satisfied only if \(y_{I}(1)=1.\)

  11. Observe that (5) is an implicit function with respect to x and \(y_{I}(x)\) is a function of x. Thus, we can differentiate the implicit function and extract \(y_{I}^{\prime }(x)\).

References

  1. Ashlagi, I., Monderer, D., Tennenholtz, M.: Simultaneous ad auctions. Math. Oper. Res. 36(1), 1–13 (2011)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Athey, S., Coey, D., Levin, J.: Set-asides and subsidies in auctions. Am. Econ. J. Microecon. 5(1), 1–27 (2013)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Athey, S., Levin, J., Seira, E.: Comparing open and sealed bid auctions: evidence from timber auctions. Q. J. Econ. 126, 207–257 (2011)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Bergemann, D., Brooks, B., Morris, S.: First-price auctions with general information structers: implications for bidding and revenue. Econometrica 85(1), 107–143 (2017)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  5. Burguet, R., Sakovics, J.: Imperfect competition in auction design. Int. Econ. Rev. 40, 231–247 (1999)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Cheng, H.: Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions. J. Math. Econ. 42, 471–498 (2006)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Gavious, A.: Separating equilibria in public auctions. B.E J. Econ. Anal. Policy 9(1), Article 37 (2009)

  8. Gavious, A., Minchuk, M.: The effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions. Int. Game Theory Rev. 14(03), 1–8 (2012)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  9. Janseen, M.C.W.: Auctioning Public Assets. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)

    Book  Google Scholar 

  10. Klemperer, P.: Auction: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton (2004)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  11. Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Math. Oper. Res. 6, 58–73 (1980)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yizhaq Minchuk.

Appendices

Appendix A: Proof of Corollary 1

Using the proposition, it is sufficient to prove that \(\lambda _{w}\ge \lambda _{s}\) and the condition \(\frac{\lambda _{w}}{\lambda _{s}}\le \frac{1}{F_{s}}\) is satisfied for \(F_{s}(x)=x^{\alpha }\) and \( F_{w}(x)=x^{\beta \text { }}\)where \(\alpha >\beta .\)

Let us first prove the first part, namely, \(1\le \frac{\lambda _{w}}{ \lambda _{s}}.\)

Substituting the distributions, we need to prove that the following inequality holds for all x

$$\begin{aligned} 1\le \frac{\beta x^{\beta -1\text { }}(1-x^{\alpha })}{\alpha x^{\alpha -1}(1-x^{\beta })}. \end{aligned}$$

or, alternatively, we need to show that

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha x^{\alpha -\beta }(1-x^{\beta })-\beta (1-x^{\alpha })\le 0 \end{aligned}$$

Note that in the case of \(x=0\), we get \(-\beta \), and when \(x=1\), we get zero. Thus, what we have left to prove is that the function is increasing. The derivative of the LHS is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \left( \alpha x^{\alpha -\beta }(1-x^{\beta })-\beta (1-x^{\alpha })\right) }{\partial x}=(\alpha -\beta )\alpha x^{\alpha -\beta -1}-(\alpha -\beta )\alpha x^{\alpha -1}\ge 0 \end{aligned}$$

providing the proof of the first part.

Now consider the proof of the following inequality \(\frac{\lambda _{w}}{ \lambda _{s}}\le \frac{1}{F_{s}}.\) In other words,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\beta x^{\beta -1\text { }}(1-x^{\alpha })}{\alpha x^{\alpha -1}(1-x^{\beta })}\le x^{-\alpha } \end{aligned}$$

or, alternatively, we need to show that

$$\begin{aligned} \beta x^{\beta \text { }}(1-x^{\alpha })-\alpha (1-x^{\beta })\le 0 \end{aligned}$$

Note that when \(x=0\), we get \(-\alpha \), and if \(x=1\), we get zero. Then, if the function is increasing, we will complete the proof. Differentiating the LHS gives

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \left( \beta x^{\beta \text { }}(1-x^{\alpha })-\alpha (1-x^{\beta })\right) }{\partial x}=(\alpha +\beta )\beta x^{\beta -1}-(\alpha +\beta )\beta x^{\alpha +\beta -1}\ge 0. \end{aligned}$$

\(\square \)

Appendix B: Proof of Corollary 2

First, we show that \(F_{s}=x^{\alpha }\) stochastically dominates \(F_{w}(v)= \frac{1-e^{-\lambda x}}{1-e^{-\lambda }}\) in the sense of the hazard rate. Namely, \(\lambda _{w}=\frac{\lambda e^{-\lambda x}}{e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}\ge \lambda _{s}=\frac{\alpha x^{\alpha -1}}{1-x^{\alpha }} \) or \(\frac{\lambda e^{-\lambda x}}{e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}-\frac{ \alpha x^{\alpha -1}}{1-x^{\alpha }}\ge 0\). Alternatively, for \(x<1\) and \( x>0\) we should prove that \(z(x)=\lambda e^{-\lambda x}\left( 1-x^{\alpha }\right) -\alpha x^{\alpha -1}\left( e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }\right) \ge 0\). Observe that in the bounds, \(z(0)=\lambda \) and that \(z(1)=0\) thus, if \(z^{\prime }(x)<0\) we find that \(z(x)\ge 0\). Differentiating z(x) gives

$$\begin{aligned} z^{\prime }(x)=-\lambda ^{2}e^{-\lambda x}(1-x^{\alpha })-\alpha (\alpha -1)x^{\alpha -2}\left( e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }\right) . \end{aligned}$$

Observe that \(e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }>0\) then, \(z^{\prime }(x)<0\) if \( \alpha \ge 1\) and thus \(\lambda _{w}\ge \lambda _{s}\). To prove that \( \frac{\lambda _{w}}{\lambda _{s}}\le \frac{1}{F_{s}}\) we show that \(\lambda _{w}F_{s}\le \lambda _{s}\) namely, \(\frac{\lambda e^{-\lambda x}}{ e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}x^{\alpha }\le \frac{\alpha x^{\alpha -1}}{ 1-x^{\alpha }}\) or \(\frac{\alpha }{1-x^{\alpha }}-\frac{\lambda xe^{-\lambda x}}{e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}\ge 0\). Again, for \(x<1\) we may show that \( T(x)=\alpha \left( e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }\right) -\lambda xe^{-\lambda x}\left( 1-x^{\alpha }\right) >0\). In the bounds \(T(0)=\alpha \left( 1-e^{-\lambda }\right) >0\) and \(T(1)=0\) thus, if \(T^{\prime }(x)<0\) we complete the proof. Differentiating T(x) gives

$$\begin{aligned} T^{\prime }(x)=-\lambda e^{-\lambda x}\left( 1-x^{\alpha }\right) (\alpha +1-\lambda x). \end{aligned}$$

If \(\alpha +1-\lambda x>0\) we have \(T^{\prime }(x)<0\) and this condetion is satidfied if \(\lambda <\alpha +1\). \(\square \)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Gavious, A., Minchuk, Y. Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders. Optim Lett 13, 69–79 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8

Keywords

JEL Classification