Abstract
We consider two simultaneous, private value, second-price auctions with identical objects for sale and two types of bidders, strong and weak, in the sense of hazard rate stochastic dominance. We show that if the strong bidders are not too strong with respect to the weak bidders, then, by setting an appropriate reserve price, a separating equilibrium exists in which strong bidders will participate in the auction with only strong bidders, and weak bidders will participate in the auction with only weak bidders.

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Notes
The “authorities” refer to government and public sector auctioneers.
Weak bidders in Janssen’s [9] case would be considered firms without proper infrastructure (newcomers) and strong bidders would be firms with proper infrastructure (incumbents).
Note that there is no restriction on n and m.
Observe that since the strategy sets are finite, the standard existence theorem ensures that Nash equilibria exist but not necessarily in pure strategies, which is the separation form we are seeking (Klemperer [10]).
The expected payoff is \(\int _{s_{j}}^{v}P^{j}(t)dt\) only if \(v\ge s_{j}\). Otherwise, it is zero.
Observe that once a bidder learns his or her valuation, the title “strong” or “weak” is irrelevant.
Observe that in equilibrium \(P^{j}(v),j=I,II\) is \( F_{s}^{n-1}(v),F_{w}^{m-1}(v),\) if strong bidders participate in auction I and weak bidders take part in auction II respectively. If a weak bidder deviates from this equilibrium and participates in auction I, the probability that s/he will win is \(P^{1}(v)=F_{s}^{n}(v)\). Similarly, if a strong bidder deviates from this equilibrium and participates in auction II, the probability that s/he will win is \(P^{2}(v)=F_{w}^{m}(v)\).
Observe that \(y_{I}(x)\) and \(y_{II}(x)\) are continuously differentiable by the implicit function theorem.
Note that in the case of \(x=1\) the equality (3) will hold only if \(\int _{y_{I}}^{1}F_{w}^{m}(v)(1-F_{s}(v))dv\) =0, and it will be satisfied only if \(y_{I}(1)=1.\)
Observe that (5) is an implicit function with respect to x and \(y_{I}(x)\) is a function of x. Thus, we can differentiate the implicit function and extract \(y_{I}^{\prime }(x)\).
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Appendices
Appendix A: Proof of Corollary 1
Using the proposition, it is sufficient to prove that \(\lambda _{w}\ge \lambda _{s}\) and the condition \(\frac{\lambda _{w}}{\lambda _{s}}\le \frac{1}{F_{s}}\) is satisfied for \(F_{s}(x)=x^{\alpha }\) and \( F_{w}(x)=x^{\beta \text { }}\)where \(\alpha >\beta .\)
Let us first prove the first part, namely, \(1\le \frac{\lambda _{w}}{ \lambda _{s}}.\)
Substituting the distributions, we need to prove that the following inequality holds for all x
or, alternatively, we need to show that
Note that in the case of \(x=0\), we get \(-\beta \), and when \(x=1\), we get zero. Thus, what we have left to prove is that the function is increasing. The derivative of the LHS is
providing the proof of the first part.
Now consider the proof of the following inequality \(\frac{\lambda _{w}}{ \lambda _{s}}\le \frac{1}{F_{s}}.\) In other words,
or, alternatively, we need to show that
Note that when \(x=0\), we get \(-\alpha \), and if \(x=1\), we get zero. Then, if the function is increasing, we will complete the proof. Differentiating the LHS gives
\(\square \)
Appendix B: Proof of Corollary 2
First, we show that \(F_{s}=x^{\alpha }\) stochastically dominates \(F_{w}(v)= \frac{1-e^{-\lambda x}}{1-e^{-\lambda }}\) in the sense of the hazard rate. Namely, \(\lambda _{w}=\frac{\lambda e^{-\lambda x}}{e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}\ge \lambda _{s}=\frac{\alpha x^{\alpha -1}}{1-x^{\alpha }} \) or \(\frac{\lambda e^{-\lambda x}}{e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}-\frac{ \alpha x^{\alpha -1}}{1-x^{\alpha }}\ge 0\). Alternatively, for \(x<1\) and \( x>0\) we should prove that \(z(x)=\lambda e^{-\lambda x}\left( 1-x^{\alpha }\right) -\alpha x^{\alpha -1}\left( e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }\right) \ge 0\). Observe that in the bounds, \(z(0)=\lambda \) and that \(z(1)=0\) thus, if \(z^{\prime }(x)<0\) we find that \(z(x)\ge 0\). Differentiating z(x) gives
Observe that \(e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }>0\) then, \(z^{\prime }(x)<0\) if \( \alpha \ge 1\) and thus \(\lambda _{w}\ge \lambda _{s}\). To prove that \( \frac{\lambda _{w}}{\lambda _{s}}\le \frac{1}{F_{s}}\) we show that \(\lambda _{w}F_{s}\le \lambda _{s}\) namely, \(\frac{\lambda e^{-\lambda x}}{ e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}x^{\alpha }\le \frac{\alpha x^{\alpha -1}}{ 1-x^{\alpha }}\) or \(\frac{\alpha }{1-x^{\alpha }}-\frac{\lambda xe^{-\lambda x}}{e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }}\ge 0\). Again, for \(x<1\) we may show that \( T(x)=\alpha \left( e^{-\lambda x}-e^{-\lambda }\right) -\lambda xe^{-\lambda x}\left( 1-x^{\alpha }\right) >0\). In the bounds \(T(0)=\alpha \left( 1-e^{-\lambda }\right) >0\) and \(T(1)=0\) thus, if \(T^{\prime }(x)<0\) we complete the proof. Differentiating T(x) gives
If \(\alpha +1-\lambda x>0\) we have \(T^{\prime }(x)<0\) and this condetion is satidfied if \(\lambda <\alpha +1\). \(\square \)
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Gavious, A., Minchuk, Y. Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders. Optim Lett 13, 69–79 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8