Abstract
Security protocols play more and more important roles with wide use in many applications nowadays. Currently, there are many tools for specifying and verifying security protocols such as Casper/FDR, ProVerif, or AVISPA. In these tools, the intruder’s ability, which either needs to be specified explicitly or set by default, is not flexible in some circumstances. Moreover, whereas most of the existing tools focus on secrecy and authentication properties, few supports privacy properties like anonymity, receipt freeness, and coercion resistance, which are crucial in many applications such as in electronic voting systems or anonymous online transactions.
In this paper, we introduce a framework for specifying security protocols in the labeled transition system (LTS) semantics model, which embeds the knowledge of the participants and parameterizes the ability of an attacker. Using this model, we give the formal definitions for three types of privacy properties based on trace equivalence and knowledge reasoning. The formal definitions for some other security properties, such as secrecy and authentication, are introduced under this framework, and the verification algorithms are also given. The results of this paper are embodied in the implementation of a SeVe module in a process analysis toolkit (PAT) model checker, which supports specifying, simulating, and verifying security protocols. The experimental results show that a SeVe module is capable of verifying many types of security protocols and complements the state-of-the-art security verifiers in several aspects. Moreover, it also proves the ability in building an automatic verifier for security protocols related to privacy type, which are mostly verified by hand now.
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Mr. Anh Tuan LUU received his MSc in Computer Science from the National University of Singapore. Since 2011, he has been a research associate in Centre for Advanced Information Systems at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His research interests include formal methods, security protocol verification, semantic web, and bioinformation retrieval.
Dr. Jun SUN received Bachelor and PhD degrees in Computing Science from National University of Singapore (NUS) in 2002 and 2006. In June 2007, he received the LEEKUAN YEWpostdoctoral fellowship in the Computer Science Department at the National University of Singapore. In Septemper 2010, he joined Singapore University of Technology and Design as an Assistant Professor. He is a visiting scientist at MIT (2011–2012). Jun’s research is in areas of software engineering and formal methods, in particular, formal specification and verification. He is the co-founder of the PAT model checker.
Dr. Yang LIU graduated in 2005 with a Bachelor of Computing in the National University of Singapore (NUS). In 2010, he obtained his PhD and continued with his post doctoral work in NUS. Dr. Liu specializes in software verification using model checking techniques. This work led to the development of a state-of-the-art model checker, Process Analysis Toolkit. In 2011, Dr. Liu is awarded the Temasek Research Fellowship at NUS as the Principal Investigator in the area of Cyber Security. He continnes to pursue research in the verification of security related software using formal methods such as model checking and theorem proving.
Dr. Jin Song DONG received Bachelor and PhD degree in Computing from University of Queensland in 1992 and 1996. From 1995–1998, he was a Research Scientist at the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation in Australia. Since 1998 he has been in the School of Computing at the National University of Singapore (NUS) where he is currently Associate Professor. He is co-founder of the PAT model checking system. He is a steering committee member of the International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods (ICFEM) and the Asia Pacific Software engineering Conference (APSEC) series. He was a Chair for many conferences and also on the editorial board of Formal Aspects of Computing and Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering, A NASA Journal.
Dr. Xiaohong LI received master of engineering degree from Tianjin University, China in 1999, and she received her Ph D in Engineering, major of Computer Science and Applications, from the Department of Computer Science, Tianjin University in Aug., 2005. Since Feb., 2001, she has been working as teacher and researcher in the Department of Computer Science, Tianjin University. Dr. Li is specialized in agentoriented software engineering, repaid development base on multiagent system, agent architecture research, agent security, and ambient intelligence.
Dr. Thanh Tho QUAN is a lecturer in the Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Hochiminh City University of Technology (HCMUT), Vietnam. He received his BEng degree in Information Technology from HCMUT in 1998 and received his PhD in 2006 from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His current research interests include formal methods, program analysis/verification, the Semantic Web, machine learning/data mining and intelligent systems.
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Luu, A.T., Sun, J., Liu, Y. et al. SeVe: automatic tool for verification of security protocols. Front. Comput. Sci. 6, 57–75 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11704-012-2903-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11704-012-2903-3