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Things That are Right with the Traditional Square of Opposition

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Abstract.

The truth conditions that Aristotle attributes to the propositions making up the traditional square of opposition have as a consequence that a particular affirmative proposition such as ‘Some A is not B’ is true if there are no Bs. Although a different convention than the modern one, this assumption remained part of centuries of work in logic that was coherent and logically fruitful.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard, Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1451, USA

    Terence Parsons

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  1. Terence Parsons
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Correspondence to Terence Parsons.

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Parsons, T. Things That are Right with the Traditional Square of Opposition. Log. univers. 2, 3–11 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-007-0031-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-007-0031-x

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