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Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas

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Abstract

Fundamental problems of environmental sustainability, including climate change and fisheries management, require collective action on a scale that transcends the political and cultural boundaries of the nation-state. Rational, self-interested neoclassical economic theories of human behavior predict tragedy in the absence of third party enforcement of agreements and practical difficulties that prevent privatization. Evolutionary biology offers a theory of cooperation, but more often than not in a context of discrimination against other groups. That is, in-group boundaries are necessarily defined by those excluded as members of out-groups. However, in some settings human’s exhibit behavior that is inconsistent with both rational economic and group driven cooperation of evolutionary biological theory. This paper reports the results of a non-cooperative game-theoretic exercise that models a tragedy of the commons problem in which groups of players may advance their own positions only at the expense of other groups. Students enrolled from multiple universities and assigned to different multi-university identity groups participated in experiments that repeatedly resulted in cooperative outcomes despite intergroup conflicts and expressions of group identity. We offer three possible explanations: (1) students were cooperative because they were in an academic setting; (2) students may have viewed their instructors as the out-group; or (3) the emergence of a small number of influential, ethical leaders is sufficient to ensure cooperation amongst the larger groups. From our data and analysis, we draw out lessons that may help to inform approaches for institutional design and policy negotiations, particularly in climate change management.

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Notes

  1. “Non-cooperative” is a technical term in game theory, which means that players make choices independently and any cooperation or contracts must be self enforcing (as opposed to enforced by a third-party).

  2. For evidence in animals and humans see Wilson (2004, 2012a, b). For plants see Bhatt et al. (2011), Biernaskie (2011), Dudley and File (2007), Murphy and Dudley (2009). For amoebas and bacteria see Cremer et al. (2012), Gilbert et al. (2007), Mehdiabadi et al. (2006), Ostrowski (2008), Rainey and Rainey (2003).

  3. Evidence for parochial altruism comes from studies involving: people playing various economic games with each other (Abbink et al. 2011; Bernhard et al. 2006; De Dreu et al. 2010, 2011; Ruffle and Sosis 2006); agent-based modeling (Choi and Bowles 2007); and evolutionary theory (Boehm 2012; Bowles 2006, 2012; Putterman 2010; Ruse 1993, 2009).

  4. In both studies, the game took place in the context of a university course module centered on sustainability ethics and Tragedy of the Commons. While the participants in each study were different, the relative homogeneity across participants in terms of age and life-style is a limitation in these types of studies. Information about the framing of the course and the reading material that preceded the game can be found in: Sadowski et al. (2013); an instructor’s guide uploaded to a digital repository found here: http://hdl.handle.net/2286/1oejg1ves5e; and in a blog post found here: http://sustainabilityethics.com/2012/09/25/ted-talks-on-morality/.

  5. Individual rationality leading to group irrationality is a characteristic of almost all collective action problems. Hardin (1968) describes this type of behavior in Tragedy of the Commons dilemmas. Whereas, Ostrom (1990), Ostrom et al. (1999) explains how common-pool resources can be successfully managed through collective action (i.e. group rationality).

  6. Zodiac birth dates are based on the Earth’s position in its orbit around the Sun. There are twelve sets of birth dates, one for each of the 30° sectors in the orbit. Each set of birth dates is named for a constellation that appears in the night sky during that time period (e.g. Aries, Taurus, Capricorn, etc.).

  7. Coincidentally, a recent paper describes what the authors call “The Joker Effect” (a name that was also inspired by The Dark Knight). They used modeling to demonstrate that a destructive or “evil agent” can actually enhance cooperation between other agents (Arenas et al. 2001). It appears that the events of the present game paralleled the Joker Effect.

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Acknowledgments

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1134943. The Global Institute for Sustainability at ASU also provided support. We thank Shirley Augustin for coding the data for Fig. 1 and Albert Stanton for research assistance. Two anonymous reviewers provided comments that strengthened the whole article. We’re indebted to David S. Wilson for invaluable feedback on this manuscript as well as to an editor at the magazine Evolution: This View of Life who provided comments on a previous article that explored similar themes. For fruitful conversation we thank: Kyle P. Whyte, Ben Hale, Robb Eason, Larry Nies, Bill Guschwan, Bert Cohen, Jay Banna, Scott McClintock, and Nicholas Hohman.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

    Jathan Sadowski

  2. School of Sustainable Engineering and the Built Environment, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

    Thomas P. Seager & Elizabeth A. Adams

  3. Philosophy and Graduate Program Faculty, Golisano Institute for Sustainability, Rochester Institute of Technology, Henrietta, NY, USA

    Evan Selinger

  4. Global Institute of Sustainability, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA

    Susan G. Spierre & Andrew Berardy

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Sadowski, J., Spierre, S.G., Selinger, E. et al. Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas. Sci Eng Ethics 21, 1197–1215 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-014-9575-3

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