Abstract
Each of the major engineering societies has its own code of ethics. Seven “common core” clauses and several code-specific clauses can be identified. The paper articulates objections to and rationales for two clauses that raise controversy: do engineers have a duty (a) to provide pro bono services and/or speak out on major issues, and (b) to associate only with reputable individuals and organizations? This latter “association clause” can be justified by the “proclamative principle,” an alternative to Kant’s universalizability requirement. At the heart of engineering codes of ethics, and implicit in what it is to be a moral agent, the “proclamative principle” asserts that one’s life should proclaim one’s moral stances (one’s values, principles, perceptions, etc.). More specifically, it directs engineers to strive to insure that their actions, thoughts, and relationships be fit to offer to their communities as part of the body of moral precedents for how to be an engineer. Understanding codes of ethics as reflections of this principle casts light both on how to apply the codes and on the distinction between private and professional morality.
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Notes
One preliminary note should be made. I am using the term “duty” in the quite weak sense that if there is a duty to x, then, in a given case, the fact that option O is an instance of x-ing normally (even if not always) counts as a moral reason (even if not a decisive one) to choose O. Most virtue theorists, Dancy (2004), Ross (1930) (who might remove the phrase “even if not always”), and Kant (2012), (who would also remove the words “even if not a decisive one”) would not take serious issue with the idea that we have duties in at least this weak sense.
For example, Prince Andrew’s continued friendship with a registered sex offender engendered much discussion about general moral duties pertinent to associations of type 6.
In addition to asking for justification for particular clauses, a reader may wonder why engineers ought to give any moral weight to codes of ethics. Davis (1991) famously argued against the views that the moral force of engineering codes of ethics stems from promissory acts of engineers in joining a society or from contracts with society. Instead, Davis suggests that codes are a convention among professionals, articulating what professionals may reasonably expect of each other in jointly pursuing the ideals of the profession on the basis of which society entrusts the profession with various benefits. As Deborah Johnson puts it, “These codes embody what members have agreed upon as the basic commitments of the profession. They also often express ideals that engineers aspire to” (Hollander et al. 1995, p. 84). I would add to Davis’ and Johnson’s insights that codes serve a rhetorical role in representing the profession, its institutional duties, its ideals, aspirations, and social role, both to members (fellow engineers) and to the general public. Engineering codes of ethics ought, then, to articulate elements of the “engineering way,” to help engineers to proclaim, through their lives, what it is to be an engineer. One may still question the definitive role of the various societies in formulating the criteria for pursuit of the ideals of engineering, much less in deciding what those ideals are. However, insofar as those societies have some institutional standing within the profession and within society, they constitute a proclamative platform at a level few individual engineers can reach, and constitute a rough consensus of the field. Thus there is some moral call for engineers to follow the codes when doing so does not conflict with what is right, as best they can determine.
The paramountcy clause may be an exception, as it stands, since “paramount” means above all else. For example, the “public” invoked by the codes is presumably the human public. Yet promoting human health and welfare may conflict with the welfare of animals and natural environments, even when the human toll of environmental harm is taken into account. Moreover, few would urge engineers to deceive the public by, for example, falsifying results of seat-belt tests, because doing so results in more people using seat-belts, thus increasing public health, welfare, or safety. Finally, as discussed at length in (Schlossberger 2013), engineering for safety may conflict with consumer autonomy. One might reasonably argue that, at least in some cases, consumers could justifiably be given the option of picking a less safe but less expensive choice, even when there is no strong utilitarian justification for that. While many decisions are made by executives, if safety is paramount, then engineers should refuse to sign off on projects in which safety is subordinated. For these reasons, the term “paramount,” should not be taken strictly to mean “above all else.” Rather, the clause should serve to emphasize the great weight engineers should place on health, safety and public welfare. It is a further issue whether this re-interpretation of “paramount” is best effected by commentary on existing codes or by modifying the language of the codes.
It might be asked why moral precedent is important, since individuals, it might be argued, must follow their individual consciences rather than conform to others’ moral judgments. The claim being made, however, is not that people are obligated to conform to their predecessor’s lives, but that individuals have a duty to strive to contribute a good example to the set of available moral precedents. Others then must use their own moral judgment about whether the example offered should serve as a precedent.
Naturally, many churches deny that Matthew forbids public prayer, but the words seem clear enough that some Christians read the passage this way. Not being a Christian, I will avoid taking sides on this question.
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Acknowledgments
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 24th Annual International Conference of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, Costa Mesa, CA, February 2015. I wish to thank Michael Davis for insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Schlossberger, E. Engineering Codes of Ethics and the Duty to Set a Moral Precedent. Sci Eng Ethics 22, 1333–1344 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-015-9708-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-015-9708-3