Abstract
When the phrase “playing God” is used in debates concerning the use of new technologies, such as cloning or genetic engineering, it is usually interpreted as a warning not to interfere with God’s creation or nature. I think that this interpretation of “playing God” arguments as a call to non-interference with nature is too narrow. In this paper, I propose an alternative interpretation of “playing God” arguments. Taking an argumentation theory approach, I provide an argumentation scheme and accompanying critical questions that capture the moral concerns expressed by “playing God” arguments. If I am right, then “playing God” arguments should be understood, not as a warning to leave God’s creation or nature alone, but rather as an invitation to think carefully about all the ways in which the use of new technologies could go seriously wrong.
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Notes
Weckert (2016, 97) goes on to say that “playing God” is “expanding the sphere over which we have control to the extent that we no longer have the knowledge or capacity to competently make decisions with respect to the expanded part.” For Weckert (2016, 98), this “suggests that, strictly speaking, the ‘playing God’ phrase is redundant” because he thinks of “playing God” arguments as arguments from consequences. As I will argue in “How “Playing God” Arguments Should Be Evaluated” section, “playing God” arguments should not be construed as arguments from consequences.
On whether or not the phrase “playing God” has its origin in Christian theology, see Peters (2003). Peters argues that there is no place in Christian theology for the “playing God” argument. For Peters (2007, 182), the issue is not whether new technologies are morally objectionable because they interfere with God’s creation, but rather whether new technologies “will respond to a transcendental ground for goodness and will enhance our capacity to love.” On the other hand, concerns about “playing God” can be traced back to the Hebrew Bible for, insofar as God granted human beings dominion over nature, there is a danger that humans would abuse their authority over nature (see, e.g., Isaiah 45: 9–12). At any rate, secular “playing God” arguments can be, and indeed have been, advanced by non-religious philosophers. See, e.g., Sandel’s (2007) “playing God” argument against human genetic enhancement.
In my argumentation scheme for “playing God” arguments, the work is done by the concept of God, not by the consequences of actions. I will say more about that in “How “Playing God” Arguments Should Be Evaluated” section.
It is important to note the difference between the so-called “God complex” and the notion of “playing God.” As far as I can tell, the former comes from psychoanalysis and the writings of the likes of Ernest Jones. According to Jones (1923, 207), “the main foundation of the [God] complex is to be discovered in a colossal narcissism, and this I regard as the most typical feature of the personalities in question. All the character-traits presently to be described can either be directly derived from narcissism, or else stand in the closest connection with it” (emphasis in original). Accordingly, unlike the “God complex,” which has to do with a narcissistic personality, the notion of “playing God” pertains specifically to actions that can be evaluated from a moral point of view regardless of one’s psychological makeup and/or character traits. For this reason, one can have a “God complex,” i.e., be a narcissist, without “playing God,” although one might “play God,” of course, and one can “play God” without being a narcissist (or having a “God complex”).
As such, what follows is a normative, not a descriptive, account of how the concept of God should be used (as opposed to how it is in fact used) in “playing God” arguments. It would be interesting to find out how the phrase “playing God” is actually used by arguers, but that is not my aim in this paper. The descriptive part of this paper begins and ends with my claim that the standard interpretation of “playing God” arguments as a warning to leave God’s creation or nature alone (discussed in “Introduction” section) is too narrow to capture all the moral concerns expressed by “playing God” arguments. For empirical evidence suggesting that “people condemn scientific procedures they perceive to involve playing God,” see Waytz and Young (2019). In this paper, my aim is to show how “playing God” arguments should be analyzed and evaluated using my proposed argumentation scheme and its accompanying critical questions.
“According to traditional western theism, classically expressed by Anselm and others, God is the greatest being possible” (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2013, 319). In philosophy of religion, “Western theism” generally refers to the so-called “Judeo-Christian tradition,” i.e., the God of the monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
I use the phrase “supposed to” here to indicate that my concern is with the concept of God, not the being. That is, the Western theistic conception of God is that of a “maximally great (or perfect)” being (Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 2017). Whether such a being exists, the concept is still that of a maximally great (or perfect) being just as, whether any triangles exist, the concept of triangle is still that of a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles. For this reason, I can talk about the concept of God while putting aside the question about the existence of God. This point will become important, as we will see, in “An Argumentation Scheme for “Playing God” Arguments” section.
Of course, God does not need to use technology because God is supposed to be an omnipotent being. For this reason, it might seem a bit strange to say of God that he would use technology. However, just as God is supposed to be all-powerful such that he does not need to use technology, God is also able to use technology, if he wants to. In other words, as an all-powerful being, God can use technology, if he wants, even though he doesn’t need to.
See Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool (Anselm 1995, 27–34) against Anselm’s ontological argument.
See Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo (Anselm 1995, 35–46).
Could not taking action count as “playing God”? For example, if we have the technology to genetically modify mosquitoes such that they will not be able to infect humans with deadly diseases, but we choose not to use it, are we “playing God” in this case? Answering this question requires getting into deep meta-ethical waters having to do with the doing/allowing distinction and the action/omission distinction, which is beyond the scope of this paper. For a book-length treatment of these distinctions, see Clarke (2014). For present purposes, I hope it is sufficient to point out that, as we have seen in “Introduction” section, “playing God” is commonly understood as a form of doing or acting rather than allowing or omitting. As Peters (2007, 173) puts it, “By ‘playing God’, […] [w]e mean changing nature.” Accordingly, allowing nature to take its course would not count as “playing God.”.
In that respect, it should be clear that I am not taking a position on the morality of genetic engineering. Whether genetic engineering is morally permissible or not will depend on one’s answers to the critical questions, CQ1-CQ3. Moreover, “playing God” arguments are only one kind of argument being made in the debate concerning the morality of genetic engineering. There are plenty of other arguments having to do with justice, fairness, equality, human well-being, human rights, and many other issues pertinent to the debate. See, e.g., Berry (2007) for more on such arguments. For this reason, “playing God” arguments are defeasible, insofar as their conclusions can be defeated by additional evidence.
Of course, AI technology can (and indeed, does) have medical applications as well. For example, AI can assist doctors in medical diagnosis (see, e.g., Buch et al. 2018). The point here is simply that AI has applications beyond the medical domain (e.g., autonomous vehicles, lethal autonomous weapons, etc.), where gene-editing technologies have obvious and direct applications.
Not all manipulation of data is immoral, of course. Among other things, AI researchers are concerned about the manipulation of data (or data management) as well as the manipulation of people by means of data handled by AI (see, e.g., Barnhizer and Barnhizer 2019). As Kate Crawford once said, AI’s potential for abuse is “a fascist’s dream” (Solon 2017).
In Walton et al.’s argumentation scheme for arguments from negative consequences, it is implicitly assumed, but not explicitly stated, that one should not bring about outcomes that are bad from the point of view of one’s goals.
I am following Walton et al. (2008) in using “practical reasoning” to talk about reasoning with respect to actions, not statements. According to Walton et al. (2008, 94–95), “A practical inference has two characteristic types of premises. One states that the rational agent has a particular goal. The other states some kind of action through which the agent could carry out the goal.” Note the use of “practically speaking” in their argument scheme for arguments from consequences quoted above.
The moral and the practical are not always so easily distinguishable. This is especially the case if one thinks of morality as action-guiding. In moral philosophy, the idea that morality is supposed to be action-guiding is often encapsulated in the principle known as “ought implies can.” The idea is that one ought to do something only if one can do it. Conversely, if one cannot do something, then one has no moral obligation to do it. For example, if I ought to keep my promise to meet a friend for dinner, then I can keep my promise to meet a friend for dinner. But if I cannot meet a friend for dinner, then I have no moral obligation to do so. Recently, this principle has been challenged by empirical evidence suggesting that people generally do assign moral obligations to agents who are incapable of fulfilling those obligations. See, e.g., Kissinger-Knox et al. (2018) and Buckwalter (2019) for recent discussions.
For the same reasons, Walton et al.’s argumentation schemes for fear and danger appeals (Walton et al. 2008, 102–104) are different from my argumentation scheme for “playing God” arguments, and thus fail to capture the moral concerns expressed by “playing God” arguments.
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I am very grateful to two anonymous reviewers of Science and Engineering Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Mizrahi, M. How to Play the “Playing God” Card. Sci Eng Ethics 26, 1445–1461 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-020-00176-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-020-00176-7