Abstract
To be intrinsically valuable means to be valuable for its own sake. Moral philosophy is often ethically anthropocentric, meaning that it locates intrinsic value within humans. This paper rejects ethical anthropocentrism and asks, in what ways might nonhumans be intrinsically valuable? The paper answers this question with a wide-ranging survey of theories of nonhuman intrinsic value. The survey includes both moral subjects and moral objects, and both natural and artificial nonhumans. Literatures from environmental ethics, philosophy of technology, philosophy of art, moral psychology, and related fields are reviewed, and gaps in these literatures are identified. Although the gaps are significant and much work remains to be done, the survey nonetheless demonstrates that those who reject ethical anthropocentrism have considerable resources available to develop their moral views. Given the many very high-stakes issues involving both natural and artificial nonhumans, and the sensitivity of these issues to how nonhumans are intrinsically valued, this is a vital project to pursue.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Availability of Data and Material
Not applicable.
Notes
The term “anthropocentrism” has been used in a variety of ways (Thompson, 2017).
The subjectivity of phenomena such as suffering do not pose these sorts of complications because they do not involve subjective moral views: only the latter is inherent to subject-based moral theory. In other words, suffering is subjective in a different sense than the “subjective” in subject-based moral theory.
Some prior publications, such as Curry (2011), survey conceptions of natural nonhuman intrinsic value, though in different ways than this paper.
If contact with extraterrestrial intelligence is made, then they may be able to communicate their moral views.
Environmental psychology also studies artificial environments such as buildings and cities.
In contrast with some literature (e.g., Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2000) our use of “object” includes physical objects such as biological organisms as well as abstract phenomena such as diversity. This terminological distinction is, in our view, not significant for the normative discussion presented in this section.
The distinction between individuals and wholes is itself a subject of debate in environmental philosophy. For example, an individual animal is also an everchanging collection of individual cells.
Including extraterrestrial life (Cockell, 2005).
The term “hedonistic” invites some confusion because the word “hedonism” is generally associated with happiness/pleasure, whereas here the term is also used to include suffering/pain. The term “subjective” is sometimes used instead, but it is not used here to avoid confusion with subject-based moral theory.
For nuance on the conservation/preservation distinction, see Norton (1986).
Richness could be treated as a stand-alone conception of intrinsic value in its own right, but for the sake of brevity, we only discuss it here.
For general discussion, see Schummer et al. (2009).
References
Abdilla, A. (2018). Beyond imperial tools: Future-proofing technology through indigenous governance and traditional knowledge systems. In J. Harle, A. Abdilla, & A. Newman (Eds.), Decolonising the digital technology as cultural practice (pp. 67–81). Tactical Space Lab.
Aguilar, W., Santamaria-Bonfil, G., Froese, T., & Gershenson, C. (2014). The past, present, and future of artificial life. Frontiers in Robots and AI. https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2014.00008
Allen, C., Smit, I., & Wallach, W. (2005). Artificial morality: Top-down, bottom-up, and hybrid approaches. Ethics and Information Technology, 7(3), 149–155. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-006-0004-4
Allen, M. W., Wilson, M., Ng, S. H., & Dunne, M. (2000). Values and beliefs of vegetarians and omnivores. Journal of Social Psychology, 140, 405–422. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224540009600481
Amdam, G. V., & Hovland, A. L. (2011). Measuring animal preferences and choice behavior. Nature Education Knowledge, 3(10), 74.
Amiot, C. E., & Bastian, B. (2014). Toward a psychology of human–animal relations. Psychological Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038147
Arias-Arévalo, P., Martín-López, B., & Gómez-Baggethun, E. (2017). Exploring intrinsic, instrumental, and relational values for sustainable management of social-ecological systems. Ecology and Society, 22(4), 43. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09812-220443
Arrhenius, G. (2005). The boundary problem in democratic theory. In F. Tersman (Ed.), Democracy unbound: Basic explorations I (pp. 14–29). Filosofiska Institutionen.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Social choice and individual values (2nd ed.). Wiley.
Australia Council for the Arts. (2020). Creating our future. Australian Government. https://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/research/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Creating-Our-Future-Results-of-the-National-Arts-Participation-Survey-PDF.pdf
Basl, J., & Bowen, J. (2020). AI as a moral right-holder. In M. D. Dubber, F. Pasquale, & S. Das (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of ethics of AI (pp. 289–306). Oxford University Press.
Baum, S. D. (2009). Description, prescription and the choice of discount rates. Ecological Economics, 69(1), 197–205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.08.024
Baum, S. D. (2010). Universalist ethics in extraterrestrial encounter. Acta Astronautica, 66(3–4), 617–623. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actaastro.2009.07.003
Baum, S. D. (2020). Social choice ethics in artificial intelligence. AI & Society, 35(1), 165–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-017-0760-1
Beckoff, M., & Pierce, J. (2009). Wild justice: The moral lives of animals. University of Chicago Press.
Bentham, J. (1907). [1789] The principles of morals and legislations. Oxford University Press.
Berleant, A. (1992). The aesthetics of environment. Temple University Press.
Berry, P. M., Fabók, V., Blicharska, M., Bredin, Y. K., Llorente, M. G., Kovács, E., Geamana, N., Stanciu, A., Termansen, M., Jääskeläinen, T., Haslett, J. R., & Harrison, P. A. (2018). Why conserve biodiversity? A multi-national exploration of stakeholders’ views on the arguments for biodiversity conservation. Biodiversity and Conservation, 27(7), 1741–1762. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-016-1173-z
Boldt, J. (2013). Do we have a moral obligation to synthesize organisms to increase biodiversity? On kinship, awe, and the value of life’s diversity. Bioethics, 27(8), 411–418. https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12051
Bolivia Government. (2012). The mother earth law and integral development to live well. Climate-laws.org https://www.climate-laws.org/geographies/bolivia/laws/the-mother-earth-law-and-integral-development-to-live-well-law-no-300
Bowd, A. D., & Bowd, A. C. (1989). Attitudes toward the treatment of animals: A study of Christian groups in Australia. Anthrozoös, 3, 20–24. https://doi.org/10.2752/089279390787057784
Brady, E. (2003). Aesthetics of the natural environment. Edinburgh University Press.
Brady, E., & Prior, J. (2020). Environmental aesthetics: A synthetic review. People and Nature, 2, 254–266. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10089
Broom, D. M. (1991). Animal welfare: Concepts and measurement. Journal of Animal Science, 69(10), 4167–4175. https://doi.org/10.2527/1991.69104167x
Brottman, M. (2007). The last stop of desire: The aesthetics of the shopping center. In A. Berleant & A. Carlson (Eds.), The aesthetics of human environments. Broadview Press.
Brown, S.-E. (2005). The under-representation of African Americans in animal welfare fields in the United States. Anthrozoös, 18, 98–121. https://doi.org/10.2752/089279305785594225
Bruskotter, J. T., Nelson, M. P., & Vucetich, J. A. (2015). Does nature possess intrinsic value? An empirical assessment of Americans’ beliefs. The Ohio State University. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1867.3129
Budd, M. (1995). Values of art. Penguin.
Bugter, R., Harrison, P., Haslett, J., & Tinch, R. (2018). Making a better case for biodiversity conservation: The BESAFE project. Biodiversity and Conservation, 27, 1549–1560. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-018-1543-9
Bull, J., & Maron, M. (2016). How humans drive speciation as well as extinction. Proceedings of the Royal Society b. the Royal Society. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2016.0600
Byrne, K., & Nichols, R. A. (1999). Culex pipiens in London underground tunnels: Differentiation between surface and subterranean populations. Heredity, 82, 7–15. https://doi.org/10.1038/sj.hdy.6884120
Callicott, J. B. (1989). In defense of the land ethic. Essays in environmental philosophy. State University of New York Press.
Calverley, D. J. (2008). Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person. AI & Society, 22, 523–537. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-007-0092-7
Calvert, J., & Tait, J. (2008). Concept note: Synthetic biology. Risks and opportunities of an emerging field. International Risk Governance Council (IRGC). https://irgc.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/IRGC_Concept_Note_Synthetic_Biology_191009_FINAL.pdf
Calvo, P., Gagliano, M., Souza, G. M., & Trewavas, A. (2020). Plants are intelligent, and here is how. Annals of Botany, 125, 11–28. https://doi.org/10.1093/aob/mcz155
Carlson, A. (2000). Aesthetics and the environment: The appreciation of nature, art and architecture. Routledge.
Cath, C., Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2018). Artificial intelligence and the ‘good society’: The US, EU, and UK approach. Science and Engineering Ethics, 24(2), 505–528. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-017-9901-7
Caviola, L., Everett, J. A. C., & Faber, N. S. (2019). The moral standing of animals: Towards a psychology of speciesism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 116(6), 1011–1029. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000182
Chalmers, D. (1997). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (2006). Strong and weak emergence. In P. Clayton & P. Davies (Eds.), The re-emergence of emergence. Oxford University Press.
Chan, K. M. A., Balvanera, P., Benessaiah, K., Chapman, M., Díaz, S., Gomez-Baggethun, E., Gould, R., Hannahs, N., Jax, K., Klain, S., Luck, G. W., Martin-Lopez, B., Muraca, B., Norton, B., Ott, K., Pascual, U., Satterfield, T., Tadaki, M., Taggart, J., & Turner, N. (2016). Opinion: Why protect nature? Rethinking values and the environment. PNAS, 113(6), 1462–1465. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1525002113
Clement, G. (2013). Animals and moral agency: The recent debate and its implications. Journal of Animal Ethics, 3(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.5406/janimalethics.3.1.0001
Coeckelbergh, M. (2012). Growing moral relations: Critique of moral status ascription. Palgrave Macmillan.
Coeckelbergh, M. (2017). Can machines create art? Philosophy and Technology, 30, 285–303. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-016-0231-5
Coeckelbergh, M. (2021). Should we treat Teddy Bear 2.0 as a Kantian dog? Four arguments for the indirect moral standing of personal social robots, with implications for thinking about animals and humans. Minds and Machines. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-020-09554-3
Coeckelbergh, M., & Gunkel, D. (2014). Facing animals: A relational, other-oriented approach to moral standing. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 27(5), 715–733. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-013-9486-3
Cockell, C. S. (2005). Duties to extraterrestrial microscopic organisms. JBIS, 58(11), 367–373.
Cockell, C. S., & Horneck, G. (2004). A planetary park system for Mars. Space Policy, 20(4), 291–295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.spacepol.2004.08.003
Cohen, S. (2014). The ethics of de-extinction. NanoEthics, 8(2), 165–178. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-014-0201-2
Comstock, G. (2000). Vexing nature? Kluwer.
Connecticut Commission on Culture and Tourism. (2004). The values studies. Rediscovering the meaning and value of arts participation. Giarts.org https://www.giarts.org/sites/default/files/values-study-rediscovering-the-meaning-and-value-of-arts-participation.pdf
Crisp, R. (2017). Well-Being. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/well-being/
Curry, P. (2011). Ecological ethics. An introduction (2nd ed.). Polity Press.
Darling, K., Nandy, P., & Breazeal, C. (2015, February 1). Empathic concern and the effect of stories in human-robot interaction. In Proceedings of the IEEE international workshop on robot and human communication (ROMAN). https://ssrn.com/abstract=2639689
Dasgupta, P. (2021). The economics of biodiversity: The Dasgupta review. UK Government, HM Treasury. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/962785/The_Economics_of_Biodiversity_The_Dasgupta_Review_Full_Report.pdf
Davison, S. A. (2012). On the intrinsic value of everything. Continuum.
DeGrazia, D. (1996). Taking animals seriously: Mental life and moral status. Cambridge University Press.
DeLeeuw, J. L., Galen, L. W., Aebersold, C., & Stanton, V. (2007). Support for animal rights as a function of belief in evolution, religious fundamentalism, and religious denomination. Society & Animals, 15, 353–363. https://doi.org/10.1163/156853007X235528
De Vriend, H. (2006). Constructing life. Early social reflections on the emerging field of synthetic biology. Rathenau Institute.
De Waal, F. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals. Harvard University Press.
De Waal, F. (2006). Primates and philosophers: How morality evolved. Princeton University Press.
Eaton, M. (2001). Merit, aesthetic, and ethical. Oxford University Press.
Ecuador Constitution. 2008. The Constitution of Ecuador, Chapter 7. Therightsofnature.org https://therightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/Rights-for-Nature-Articles-in-Ecuadors-Constitution.pdf
Ehrlich, P., & Ehrlich, A. (1981). Extinction: The causes and conseqeunces of the disappearance of species. Random House.
European Union. (2010). Directive 2010/63/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes. Official Journal of the European Union, L, 276, 33–79.
Feindt, W., Fincke, O., & Hadrys, H. (2014). Still a one species genus? Strong genetic diversification in the world’s largest living odonate, the Neotropical damselfly Megaloprepus caerulatus. Conservation Genetics, 15(2), 469–481. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10592-013-0554-z
Fitzpatrick, S. (2017). Animal morality: What is the debate about? Biology & Philosophy, 32(6), 1151–1183. https://doi.org/10.1007/S10539-017-9599-6
Fletcher, G. (2015). Objective list theories. In G. Fletcher (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of philosophy of well-being (pp. 148–160). Taylor and Francis.
Floridi, L. (2002). On the intrinsic value of information objects and the infosphere. Ethics and Information Technology, 4(4), 287–304. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021342422699
Galvin, S. L., & Herzog, H. A., Jr. (1992). Ethical ideology, animal rights activism, and attitudes toward the treatment of animals. Ethics & Behavior, 2, 141–149. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327019eb0203_1
Gebhard, U., Nevers, P., & Billmann-Mahecha, E. (2003). Moralizing trees: Anthropomorphism and identity in children’s relationships to nature. In S. Clayton & S. Opotow (Eds.), Identity and the natural environment: The psychological significance of nature (pp. 91–111). MIT Press.
Ghilarov, A. M. (2000). Ecosystem functioning and intrinsic value of biodiversity. Oikos, 90(2), 408–412.
Gillies, C. (2016). The value of intrinsic value in the arts: A guest post by Carter Gillies. An Arts Journal Blog. https://www.artsjournal.com/jumper/2016/03/the-value-of-intrinsic-value-in-the-arts-a-guest-post-by-carter-gillies/
Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and fundamental reality. Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. (1995). Aesthetic value. Westview Press.
Goodpaster, K. E. (1978). On being morally considerable. The Journal of Philosophy, 75(6), 308–325. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025709
Haapala, A. (Ed.). (1998). The city as cultural metaphor: Studies in urban aesthetics. International Institute of Applied Aesthetics.
Hale, M. F., Buchanan, E., Winfield, A. F. T., Timmis, J., Hart, E., Eiben, A. E., Angus, M., Veenstra, F., Li, W., Woolley, R., De Carlo, M., & Tyrrell, A. M. (2019). The ARE robot fabricator: How to (re)produce robots that can evolve in the real world. The 2019 Conference on Artificial Life. https://doi.org/10.1162/isal_a_00147
Haraway, D. (1991). A cyborg manifesto. In Simians, cyborgs and women: The reinvention of nature. Routledge.
Herrmann, P., Waxman, S. R., & Medin, D. L. (2010). Anthropocentrism is not the first step in children’s reasoning about the natural world. PNAS, 107(22), 9979–9984. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1004440107
Hofstadter, D. R. & Dennett, D. C. (1981). The minds I: Fantasies and reflections on self and soul. Basic Books.
Hubbard, F. P. (2011). ‘Do androids dream?’: Personhood and intelligent artifacts. Temple Law Review, 83(2), 405–441.
Hurka, T. (1993). Perfectionism. Oxford University Press.
Izutsu, T., & Izutsu, T. (1981). The theory of beauty in the classical aesthetics of Japan. Martinus Nijhoff.
Jaynes, T. L. (2020). Legal personhood for artificial intelligence: Citizenship as the exception to the rule. AI & Society, 35(2), 343–354. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-019-00897-9
Johansson-Stenman, O. (2018). Animal welfare and social decisions: Is it time to take Bentham seriously? Ecological Economics, 145, 90–103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2017.08.019
Kelley, D., & Atreides, K. (2020). AGI protocol for the ethical treatment of artificial general intelligence systems. Procedia Computer Science, 169, 501–506. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procs.2020.02.219
Kover, T. R. (2014). Are the oil sands sublime? Edward Burtynsky and the vicissitudes of the sublime. In R. Boschman & M. Trono (Eds.), Found in Alberta: Environmental themes for the Anthropocene. Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
Kreitman, N. (2011). Intrinsic aesthetic value revisited. Metaphilosophy, 42(4), 470–478. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01706.x
Latour, B. (1993). We have never been modern. Harvard University Press.
Latour, B. (2017). Facing Gaia. Polity Press.
Leopold, A. (1949). A sand county almanac. Oxford University Press.
Levy, N. (2002). The intrinsic value of cultures. Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 9(2), 49–57.
Lewis, J. E. (2020). Indigenous protocol and artificial intelligence position paper. The Initiative for Indigenous Futures and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR). https://doi.org/10.11573/spectrum.library.concordia.ca.00986506
Liao, S. M. (2020). The moral status and rights of artificial intelligence. In S. M. Liao (Ed.), Ethics of artificial intelligence (pp. 480–503). Oxford University Press.
Lima, G., Kim, C., Ryu, S., Jeon, C., & Cha, M. (2020). Collecting the public perception of AI and robot rights. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 4(CSCW2), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1145/3415206
Link, H.-J. (2013). Playing God and the intrinsic value of life: Moral problems for synthetic biology? Science and Engineering Ethics, 19(2), 435–448. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-012-9353-z
Longbottom, S. E., & Slaughter, V. (2016). Direct experience with nature and the development of biological knowledge. Early Education & Development, 27(8), 1145–1158. https://doi.org/10.1080/10409289.2016.1169822
Loughnan, S., Haslam, N., & Bastian, B. (2010). The role of meat consumption in the denial of moral status and mind to meat animals. Appetite, 55(1), 156–159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2010.05.043
Lovelock, J. (1979). Gaia: A new look at life on earth. Oxford University Press.
Low, P. (Ed.). (2012). The Cambridge declaration on consciousness. The Francis Crick memorial conference on consciousness in human and non-human animals, Churchill College, University of Cambridge. http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf
Lupetti, M. L. (2017). Robots, aesthetics, and the heritage context. Interactions, 24(5), 6–7. https://doi.org/10.1145/3125389
Lupisella, M. (2016). Cosmological theories of value: Relationalism and connectedness as foundations for cosmic creativity. In J. S. J. Schwartz & T. Milligan (Eds.), The ethics of space exploration (pp. 75–91). Springer.
Maier, D. S. (2012). What’s so good about biodiversity? Springer.
Manovich, L. (2018). AI aesthetics. Strelka Press.
Mathews, F. (1991). The ecological self. Routledge.
McKibben, B. (1989). The end of nature. Random House.
McShane, K. (2007). Why environmental ethicists shouldn’t give up on intrinsic value. Environmental Ethics, 29(1), 43–61. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics200729128
McShane, K. (2016). Is biodiversity intrinsically valuable? (And what might that mean?). In J. Garson, A. Plutynski, & S. Sarkar (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of philosophy of biodiversity, (pp 155–167). Routledge.
Miller, P. (1982). Value as richness: Toward a value theory for an expanded naturalism in environmental ethics. Environmental Ethics, 4(2), 101–114.
Milligan, T. (2015). Nobody owns the moon: The ethics of space exploitation. McFarland and Company.
Monsó, S., Benz-Schwarzburg, J., & Bremhorst, A. (2018). Animal morality: What it means and why it matters. The Journal of Ethics, 22, 283–310. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-018-9275-3
Moore, A. (2017). Objectivism about animal and alien well-being. Analysis, 77(2), 328–336. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx060
Moore, G. E. (1965). Principia ethica. Cambridge University Press.
Morton, T. (2007). Ecology without nature. Harvard University Press.
Naam, R. (2005). More than human: Embracing the promise of biological enhancement. Broadway Press.
National Endowment for the Arts. (2020). Why we engage: Attending, creating, and performing art. US Government. https://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/Why-We-Engage-0920_0.pdf
Ng, Y. K. (1995). Towards welfare biology: Evolutionary economics of animal consciousness and suffering. Biology and Philosophy, 10(3), 255–285. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00852469
Nijssen, S. R. R., Müller, B. C. N., van Baaren, R. B., & Paulus, M. (2019). Saving the robot or the human? Robots who feel deserve moral care. Social Cognition, 37(1), 41–56. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2019.37.1.41
Nomikos, A. (2018). Place matters. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 76(4), 453–462. https://doi.org/10.1111/jaac.12598
Norton, B. G. (1986). Conservation and preservation: A conceptual rehabilitation. Environmental Ethics, 8(3), 195–220. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics1986832
Næss, A. (1989). Ecology, community and lifestyle: Outline of an ecosophy. Cambridge University Press.
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014). From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated information theory 3.0. PLoS Computational Biology, 10(5), e1003588. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588
O’Neill, J. (2003). The varieties of intrinsic value. In A. Light & H. Rolston (Eds.), Environmental ethics: An anthology (pp. 131–142). Blackwell.
Opotow, S. (1993). Animals and the scope of justice. Journal of Social Issues, 49(1), 71–85. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1993.tb00909.x
Owe, A. (2019). Environmental ethics in outer space: A macrostrategic space journey through cosmism, posthumanism and moral enhancement. (Thesis). The University of Oslo Reprosentralen. http://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-72512.
Owe, A., & Baum, S. D. (2021). Moral consideration of nonhumans in the ethics of artificial intelligence. AI & Ethics, 1(4), 517–528. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-021-00065-0
Parise, A. G., Gagliano, M., & Souza, G. M. (2020). Extended cognition in plants: Is it possible? Plant Signalling and Behavior, 15(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/15592324.2019.1710661
Parsons, G. (2008). Aesthetics and nature. Continuum Press.
Pascual, U., Gould, R., & Chan, K. M. A. (2018). Sustainability challenges: Relational values. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 35(1), 1–132.
Paul, E. S. (2000). Love of pets and love of people. In A. L. Podberscek, E. S. Paul, & J. A. Serpell (Eds.), Companion animals and us: Exploring the relationships between people and pets (pp. 168–186). Cambridge University Press.
Plumwood, V. (2002). Environmental culture and the ecological crisis of reason. Routledge.
Rabinowicz, W., & Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2000). A distinction in value: Intrinsic and for its own sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100(1), 33–51.
Rabinowitch, I. (2019). Synthetic biology in the brain: A vision of organic robots. The 2019 Conference on Artificial Life. https://doi.org/10.1162/isal_a_00236
Raymond, M., & DeNardis, L. (2015). Multistakeholderism: Anatomy of an inchoate global institution. International Theory, 7(3), 572–616. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971915000081
Reber, A. (2019). The first minds. Caterpillars, ‘karyotes’, and consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Regan, T. (1983). The case for animal rights. University of California Press.
Renoult, J. P. (2016). The evolution of aesthetics: A review of models. In Z. Kapoula & M. Vernet (Eds.), Aesthetics & neuroscience: Scientific and artistic perspectives (pp. 271–299). Springer.
Rifkin, J. (1985). Declaration of a heretic. Routledge.
Rollin, B. E. (1993). Animal welfare, science and value. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 6(2), 44–50.
Rolston, H., III. (2012). A new environmental ethics. Routledge.
Rolston, H., III. (1988). Environmental ethics. Duties to and values in the natural world. Temple University Press.
Rolston, H., III. (2005). Environmental virtue ethics: Half the truth but dangerous as a whole. In R. Sandler & P. Cafaro (Eds.), Environmental virtue ethics (pp. 61–78). Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Rolston, H., III. (1986). The preservation of natural value in the solar system. In E. Hargrove (Ed.), Beyond spaceship earth: Environmental ethics and the solar system (pp. 140–182). Sierra Club Books.
Rowlands, M. (2012). Can animals be moral? Oxford University Press.
Russell, S. J. (2019). Human compatible: Artificial intelligence and the problem of control. Viking.
Rønnow-Rasmussen, T., & Zimmerman, M. J. (2005). Recent work on intrinsic value. Springer.
Saito, Y. (1985). The Japanese appreciation of nature. British Journal of Aesthetics, 25(3), 239–251. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/25.3.239
Sandler, R. (2013). The ethics of reviving long extinct species. Conservation Biology, 28(2), 354–360. https://doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12198
Sarkar, S. (2010). Diversity: A philosophical perspective. Diversity, 2(1), 127–141. https://doi.org/10.3390/d2010127
Schmidtz, D. (1998). Are all species equal? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 15(1), 57–67. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5930.00073
Schummer, J., MacLennan, B., & Taylor, N. (2009). Aesthetic values in technology and engineering design. In A. Meijers (Ed.), Philosophy of technology and engineering sciences, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 9, (pp. 1031–1068). Elsevier.
Schweitzer, A. (1976). The ethic of reverence for life. In T. Regan & P. Singer (Eds.), Animal rights and human obligations. Prentice-Hall.
Singer, P. (1977). Animal liberation. Granada.
Solum, L. B. (1992). Legal personhood for artificial intelligences. North Carolina Law Review, 70(4), 1231–1287.
Sommer, K., Nielsen, M., Draheim, M., Redshaw, J., Vanman, E. J., & Wilks, M. (2019). Children’s perceptions of the moral worth of live agents, robots and inanimate objects. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 187, 104656. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2019.06.009
Soulé, M. E. (1985). What is conservation biology? BioScience, 35(11), 727–734. https://doi.org/10.2307/1310054
Spence, P. R., Edwards, A., & Edwards, C. (2018). Attitudes, prior interaction, and petitioner credibility predict support for considering the rights of robots. In Companion of the 2018 ACM/IEEE international conference on human-robot interaction (pp. 243–244). Presented at the HRI ’18: ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction, Chicago IL USA: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3173386.3177071
Stang, N. D. (2012). Artworks are not valuable for their own sake. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 70(3), 271–280.
Stecker, R. (2006). Aesthetic experience and aesthetic value. Philosophy Compass, 1(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00007.x
Stecker, R. (2010). Aesthetics and the philosophy of art. An introduction (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Steg, L., van den Berg, A. E., & de Groot, J. I. M. (Eds.). (2013). Environmental psychology: An introduction. BPS Blackwell.
Stibbe, D., Prescott, D., Brooks, R.F., Gilbert, J. (2020). The SDG partnership guidebook: A practical guide to building high impact multi-stakeholder partnerships for the sustainable development goals. United Nations and The Partnering Initiative.
Stirling, A. (2007). A general framework for analysing diversity in science, technology and society. Journal of the Royal Society Interface, 4(15), 707–719.
Sylvan, R., & Bennett, D. (1994). The greening of ethics: From human chauvinism to deep-green theory. White Horse Press.
Szentgáli-Tóth, B. A. (2021). Robotic personhood and its potential impact to democracy. Should artificial intelligence be citizens and vested with right to vote? In The law of the future - The future of law (pp. 771–807). Páneurópska vysoká škola.
Tännsjö, T. (1998). Hedonistic utilitarianism. Edinburgh University Press.
Taverna, A. S., Medin, D. L., & Waxman, S. R. (2016). “Inhabitants of the earth”: Reasoning about folkbiological concepts in Wichi children and adults. Early Education & Development, 27, 1109–1129. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315122601-2
Taylor, P. (2011). [1986] Respect for nature: A theory of environmental ethics. Princeton University Press.
Thomas, C. D. (2015). Rapid acceleration of plant speciation during the Anthropocene. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 30(8), 448–455. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2015.05.009
Thompson, A. (2017). Anthropocentrism: Humanity as peril and promise. In S. M. Gardiner & A. Thompson (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of environmental ethics (pp. 77–90). Oxford University Press.
Tietenberg, T. H., & Lewis, L. (2018). Environmental and natural resource economics (11th ed.). Routledge.
Tonn, B. E. (2002). Distant futures and the environment. Futures, 34(2), 117–132. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0016-3287(01)00050-7
Torrance, S. (2011). Machine ethics and the idea of a more-than-human moral world. In M. Anderson & S. L. Anderson (Eds.), Machine ethics (pp. 115–137). Cambridge University Press.
Vakoch, D. A. (Ed.). (2014). Extraterrestrial altruism. Evolution and ethics in the cosmos. Springer.
Van Wynsberghe, A., & Robbins, S. (2019). Critiquing the reasons for making artificial moral agents. Science and Engineering Ethics, 25, 719–735. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-018-0030-8
Vetlesen, J. A. (2015). The denial of nature: Environmental philosophy in the era of global capitalism. Routledge.
Walker, C., & Scott-Melnyk, S. D. (2002). Reggae to Rachmaninoff: How and why people participate in arts and culture. The Urban Institute. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/60286/310595-Reggae-to-Rachmaninoff.PDF
Walmsley, B., & Oliver, J. (2011). Assessing the value of the arts. In B. Walmsley (Ed.), Key issues in the arts and entertainment industry. Goodfellow.
Wilks, M., Caviola, L., Kahane, G., & Bloom, P. (2020). Children prioritize humans over animals less than adults do. Psychological Science, 32(1), 27–38.
Wolfe, M. W. (2008). The shadows of future generations. Duke Law Journal, 57(6), 1897–1932.
Ziesche, S., & Yampolskiy, R. (2019). Towards AI welfare science and policies. Big Data and Cognitive Computing. https://doi.org/10.3390/bdcc3010002
Zohn, J. R. (2015). When robots attack: How should the law handle self-driving cars that cause damages. University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, 2015(2), 461–485.
Acknowledgements
We thank Robert de Neufville for helpful feedback on an earlier version of this manuscript. Any remaining errors are the authors’ alone.
Funding
None.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
None.
Code Availability
Not applicable.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Owe, A., Baum, S.D. & Coeckelbergh, M. Nonhuman Value: A Survey of the Intrinsic Valuation of Natural and Artificial Nonhuman Entities. Sci Eng Ethics 28, 38 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-022-00388-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-022-00388-z