Abstract
In this paper, we investigate some theoretical grounds for bridging the gap between an organism-centered biology and the chemical basis of biological explanation, as expressed in the prevailing molecular perspective in biological research. First, we present a brief survey of the role of the organism concept in biological thought. We advance the claim that emergentism (with its fundamental tenets: ontological physicalism, qualitative novelty, property emergence, theory of levels, irreducibility of the emergents, and downward causation) can provide a metaphysical basis for a coherent sort of organicism. Downward causation (DC) is the key notion in emergentist philosophy, as shown by the tension between the aspects of dependence and nonreducibility in the concept of supervenience, preferred by many philosophers to emergence as a basis for nonreductive physicalism. As supervenience physicalism does not lead, arguably, to a stable nonreductive physicalist account, we maintain that a philosophical alternative worthy of investigation is that of a combination of supervenience and property emergence in the formulation of such a stance. Taking as a starting-point O’Connor’s definition of an emergent property, we discuss how a particular interpretation of downward causation (medium DC), inspired by Aristotelian causal modes, results in an explanation of property emergence compatible with both physicalism and non-reductionism. In this account of emergence, one may claim that biology, as a science of living organization, is and remains a science of the organism, even if completely explained by the laws of chemistry. We conclude the paper with a new definition of an emergent property.
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El-Hani, C.N., Emmeche, C. On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation. Theory Biosci. 119, 234–275 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12064-000-0018-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12064-000-0018-0