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Incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing based on supply-demand relationship

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A Correction to this article was published on 25 November 2019

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Abstract

Mobile crowd sensing has become an efficient paradigm for performing large scale sensing tasks. An incentive mechanism is important for the mobile crowd sensing system to stimulate participants, and to achieve good service quality. In this paper, we design the incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing, where the price and supply of the resource contributed by the smartphone users are determined by the supply-demand relationship of market. We present two models of mobile crowd sensing: the resource model and the budget model. In the resource model, each sensing task has the least resource demand. In the budget model, each task has a budget constraint. We design an incentive mechanism for each of the two models. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the proposed incentive mechanisms achieve computational efficiency, profitability, individual rationality, and truthfulness. Moreover, the designed mechanisms can satisfy the properties of non-monopoly and constant discount under certain conditions.

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Change history

  • 25 November 2019

    Correction is needed in the original article. The university name in affiliation (1) is changed from ���University of Posts and Telecommunications��� to ���Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications���.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the NSFC (No. 61472193, 61502251), and NSF (No. 1444059, 1717315).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Big Data Security & Intelligent Processing, University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing, China

    Jia Xu, Wei Lu, Lijie Xu & Tao Li

  2. Department of Computer Science, Colorado School of Mines, Golden, USA

    Dejun Yang

Authors
  1. Jia Xu
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  2. Wei Lu
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  3. Lijie Xu
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  4. Dejun Yang
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  5. Tao Li
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Jia Xu.

Additional information

This article is part of the Topical Collection: Special Issue on Network Coverage

Guest Editors: Shibo He, Dong-Hoon Shin, and Yuanchao Shu

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Xu, J., Lu, W., Xu, L. et al. Incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing based on supply-demand relationship. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 12, 577–588 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-018-0648-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-018-0648-y

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