Abstract
By fully utilizing the capability of the spreading intelligent terminals, crowd spectrum sensing is an efficient and cost-effective framework to realize large-scale and broadband spectrum sensing. However, traditional crowd sensing system relies on a centralized architecture, which not only face severe security and privacy issues, but also may not be able to attract enough users to participate in the sensing tasks due to the lack of effective incentive mechanisms and guaranteed rewards. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based crowd spectrum sensing framework to achieve secure and privacy-preserving spectrum sensing with guaranteed rewards for participating users. Considering the constraint of the sensing task and the workload of users, the optimal pricing and sensing task allocation scheme under the minimum sensing task constraint is investigated by leveraging Stackelberg game model. We analyze the Nash equilibrium of the sub-games and derive the optimal pricing and sensing task allocation strategy, for both uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing schemes. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme and it is shown that the scheme can maximize the utility while ensuring the completion of the sensing tasks.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported in part by the National Key R&D Program of China under Grant 2020YFB1005900, the National Natural Science Foundation of China No. 62001220, the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangsu Province BK20200440, the Future Network Scientific Research Fund Project FNSRFP-2021-YB-03, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities No. 1004-YAH20016, No. NT2020009.
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Chen, W., Wang, W., Li, Z. et al. Joint pricing and task allocation for blockchain empowered crowd spectrum sensing. Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl. 15, 783–792 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-021-01283-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12083-021-01283-3