Abstract
The aim of this paper is to consider how the economic size and growth of a country affect its environmental policy under uncertainty in a real options framework. In contrast to the prior literature, this work explicitly takes into account the link between the development of an economy and the pollution state of the environment. Policy implementation is found to be determined by the levels of the economic size and the disutility of the pollution. We illustrate how to apply our method to the implementation of an environmental policy in an actual situation and show with numerical calculations that the optimal threshold is sensitive only to the subjective time preference, while the expected implementation time is affected by other parameters.
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Notes
It can be argued that the dynamics of the GDP is influenced by the environmental policy. The assumption is made because we focus on the analysis of how each parameter affects the policy timing, not the effect of the policy on the dynamics of GDP. Also, as we see in the following numerical results, the policy implementation is less affected by μ Y and σ Y . Therefore, the assumption would not lower the contribution of the paper.
Here N and A indicate the state before and after the adoption of the new policy, respectively.
We do not calibrate μθ or σθ with the market prices of CO2 emission since the data are insufficient.
Pindyck (2006) insist in page 48 that “with discount rates of 4% or more, it would be very hard to justify almost any policy that imposes costs today but yields benefits only 50 or a 100 years in the future”.
If ϕ is the risk-adjusted discount rate, it must be that
$$ {\text{Price}}\;{\text{of}}\;{\text{unit}}\;{\text{pollution = }}\mathbb{E}\left[ {\int\limits_{0}^{\infty } {{\text{e}}^{{ - \phi t}} \theta _{t} (1 \times {\text{e}}^{{ - \delta t}} )\left. {{\text{d}}t} \right|} \theta _{0} } \right] = {\frac{{\theta _{0} }}{{\phi + \delta - \mu \theta }}}. $$
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima and seminar participants at Kyoto University for their helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The authors also appreciate the comments by anonymous referees that greatly enhanced the paper.
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The first-named author is grateful to the financial support by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture (MEXT), “Special Coordination Funds for Promoting Science and Technology”.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
First, we calculate W A = W A (θ, Y, M), the value function for the “adopt” region \({\mathcal{A}} \subset {\bf R}R^2\) \(((\theta, Y) \in {\mathcal{A}} \Leftrightarrow \beta_t = \beta_A).\) When M t follows the dynamics (2), we have for t > 0
Then, substituting it into (4) and applying Fubini’s theorem, we can directly calculate the value function as
Using the tower property of conditional expectations (t ≥ s), we have
Thus, we can derive the third term on the right-hand side of Eq. 12 as
As a result, we obtain the value function (8).
Next, we consider the case of the “nonadopt” region. Let W N = W N (θ, Y, M) denote the value function for the nonadopt region \(((\theta, Y,) \in {\bf R}R^2 \setminus {\mathcal{A}} \Leftrightarrow \beta_t = \beta_N).\) W N (θ,Y, M) must satisfy the Bellman equation
Now we conjecture the solution of the above ODE as
where a, b, c and γ are some constants to be derived. Substituting (13) into (14), we have
By setting the coefficient of each term to be zero, we obtain the constants a to γ.
First, we deal with the term (Y θξ)γ in Eq. (14). Setting the coefficient of (Y θξ)γ to be zero, we obtain
By the standard real options arguments, γ must be greater than 1. Hence, we have
Second, calculating the term of θM yields
Third, for the term θY ξ, we get
Consequently, we obtain
We still have two unknown parameters, the constant a and the threshold. They can be derived by the two boundary conditions, i.e., the value-matching and the smooth-pasting conditions.
By the definition of \({\mathcal{A}},\) we know that when (θ t , Y t ) first reaches \(\partial {\mathcal{A}},\) the policy maker will exercise his or her option to adopt the policy. The value-matching condition says that W N (θ B , Y B , M) = W A (θ B , Y B , M) − K for \((\theta_B, Y_B) \in \partial {\mathcal{A}}.\) Therefore, we derive
where ζ B : = θ B Y ξ B . Solving with respect to a, we obtain
The smooth-pasting condition implies that W N is maximized with respect to the boundary condition ζ B . In this case, we get
We finally obtain
and
Substituting (16) and (17) into (15), we obtain (7). \(\hfill\square\)
Appendix 2: Proof of Corollary 1
Note that γ satisfies the characteristic equation as
Then, by rearranging (18), we have the relation
and
The derivative with respect to ϕ From (19), we calculate
Since γ is a positive root of (18), we verify that \(\frac{\partial \gamma}{\partial \phi} > 0\) , and that ζ B is increasing in ϕ.
The derivative with respect to μ Y : We have
Now the second inequality of (9) readily follows from noting that \(\frac{\partial \gamma}{\partial \mu_Y} < 0.\)
The derivative with respect to μθ: Eq. (19) yields
Since \( {\frac{{\partial \gamma }}{{\partial \mu _{\theta } }}} < 0, \) we have the third inequality of (9).
Inequalities in (10): When the correlation coefficient ρ is positive, we observe that
By a similar procedure to the above, we get (10).\( \square \)
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Nishide, K., Ohyama, A. Using real options theory to a country’s environmental policy: considering the economic size and growth. Oper Res Int J 9, 229–250 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12351-009-0056-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12351-009-0056-4