Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Corporate R&D intensity and high cash holdings: post-crisis analysis

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Operational Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper examines the effect of R&D investment on firms’ level cash holdings in the UK market after the financial market crisis, using the trade-off model and the pecking order model as a theoretical backdrop. For this purpose, we employ a sample of UK listed non-financial no-utility firms throughout 2010–2018. Our findings indicate that R&D spending provides a reasonable explanation for UK firms’ increased cash ratio during post-crisis. Using Fama and French’s (Industry costs of equity. J Financ Econ 43(2): 153–193, 1997) classification, we conduct cross-sectional linear regression analysis for industry and firm groups’ sub-samples. The analysis provides evidence of considerable heterogeneity in terms of cash holding and investment spending across industries. What is more, technology and healthcare firms have contributed to the increase in cash levels. The findings reveal a positive and significant effect of R&D intensity on cash holdings, while R&D-intensive firms hoard cash driven by industry concentration. We confirm our findings’ persistence after performing various additional analyses and robustness checks. This is the first study to provide empirical evidence in the post-crisis era on how R&D influences firm-level cash holdings in the UK market setting.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. There is limited evidence in the academic literature on post-crisis recovery at the firm level. A recent effort in this direction is the study of Jin et al. (2018), that examined the business performance after the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Hence, we consider that focusing on a post-financial crisis sample can provide important information to stakeholders for the cash-R&D investment nexus.

  2. According to the Office for National Statistics (2019a), statistics revealed that total research and development expenditure by UK firms amounted to approximately 25.0 billion British pounds in 2018, with an increase of 5.8% from the previous year.

  3. To give an example, a Financial Times’ article “UK’s largest companies sit on £53bn mountain of cash”, published on October 6, 2014 indicates that the cash held of UK firms has increased by more than four times relative to the cash level reported on 2008’s financial statements (see https://www.ft.com/content/e29a1cee-4c95-11e4-a0d7-00144feab7de).

  4. In terms of the trade-off theory, the theoretical framework relates to both optimal debt ratios and optimal cash balances. Throughout the study, we employ the Miller-Orr’s (1966) model of cash management and the transaction motive by Bates et al. (2009) to examine the firm-level cash holding in the UK market.

  5. We follow Haushalter et al. (2007) who defines predation risk as the likelihood of market share loss due to insufficient investment.

  6. Based on Froot et al. (1993), we define hedging as the firm’s use of cash to gain advantage on profitable investment projects at the expense of its’ rivals.

  7. We acknowledge that financial firms, such as banks, insurance companies, have different accounting requirements (see, Deloof 2003). We exclude firms in the financial sector, as they have different cash requirements and can be subject to some form of monitoring supervision rather than firms in the non-financial sector; therefore, we choose to exclude these firms from our analysis to ensure the legitimacy of our findings.

  8. To assess the economic significance, we multiply the standard deviation of the XRD score by the coefficient (Column 1) and divide by average CASH: (st.dev. XRD x coeff. XRD)/ mean CASH = (0.441 × 0.088)/16.8 = 0.231 or 23.10%.

  9. In an unreported analysis, we investigate the association between a firm’s R&D investment and its excess cash. We first estimate yearly cross-sectional regressions based on Eq. (1) after excluding the R&D ratio. The abnormal firm-level cash ratio is calculated using the residuals (see Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Opler et al. 1999). We then regress the abnormal cash measure on the R&D ratio to examine the empirical prediction. Consistent with our main inferences, the result reveals a positive association between the two variables. Hence, we cannot reject the empirical hypothesis (H1).

  10. The analysis covers ten groups of firms since firms in financial and utility industries are excluded. For example, we construct a dummy variable “fama1” that takes the value of 1 for the industry of Consumer Non-Durables and 0 otherwise. Kenneth French’s website details the mapping of SIC codes for the Fama–French 12 industries: https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_12_ind_port.html.

  11. In untabulated analysis, we use lagged independent variables in the empirical model to allay endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we lag by one period (t-1) the R&D ratio and the control variables of Eq. (1). The coefficient on XRD is positive and statistically significant, where the dependent variable is CASH, which is consistent with the main regression results. Hence, we confirm our first proposed hypothesis stating a positive relation between R&D investment and cash holding at the firm level. Although not tabulated for brevity, the results are available upon request.

References

  • Akbar S, Rehman S, Liu J, Shah SZA (2017) Credit supply constraints and financial policies of listed companies during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Res Int Bus Financ 42:559–571

    Google Scholar 

  • Akdoğu E, MacKay P (2008) Investment and competition. J Financ Quant Anal 43(2):299–330

    Google Scholar 

  • Alam A, Uddin M, Yazdifar H (2017) Financing behaviour of R&D investment in the emerging markets: the role of alliance and financial system. R&D Manag 49(1):21–32

    Google Scholar 

  • Almeida H, Campello M (2007) Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and corporate investment. Rev Financ Stud 20(5):1429–1460

    Google Scholar 

  • Almeida JR, Eid W (2014) Access to finance, working capital management and company value: evidences from Brazilian companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA. J Bus Res 67(5):924–934

    Google Scholar 

  • Almeida H, Campello M, Weisbach MS (2011) Corporate financial and investment policies when future financing is not frictionless. J Corp Finan 17(3):675–693

    Google Scholar 

  • Antoniou A, Guney Y, Paudyal K (2008) The determinants of capital structure: capital market-oriented versus bank-oriented institutions. J Financ Quant Anal 43(1):59–92

    Google Scholar 

  • Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. J Econom 68:29–51

    Google Scholar 

  • Baldi G, Bodmer A (2017) R&D investments and corporate cash holdings. Econ Innov New Technol. https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2017.1378191

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bates T, Kahle K, Stulz R (2009) Why do U. S. firms hold so much than they used to? J Finance 64(5):1985–2021

    Google Scholar 

  • Bates TW, Chang CH, Chi JD (2018) Why has the value of cash increased over time? J Financ Quant Anal 53(2):749–787

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol WJ (1952) The transactions demand for cash: an inventory theoretic approach. Oxf J 66:545–556

    Google Scholar 

  • Begenau J, Palazzo B (2021) Firm selection and corporate cash holdings. J Financ Econ 139(3):697–718

    Google Scholar 

  • Besley S, Brigham EF (2008) Essentials of managerial finance, 14th edn. Thomson Southwestern, USA, Mason

    Google Scholar 

  • Bigelli M, Sánchez-Vidal J (2012) Cash holdings in private firms. J Bank Finance 36(1):26–35

    Google Scholar 

  • Blundell R, Bond S (1998) Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. J Econom 87:115–143

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolton P, Scharfstein D (1990) A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. Am Econ Rev 80(1):93–106

    Google Scholar 

  • Borisova G, Brown JR (2013) R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds: new evidence on financing constraints and intangible investment. J Bank Finance 37(1):159–173

    Google Scholar 

  • Boubakri N, Ghoul SE, Saffar W (2013) Cash holdings of politically connected firms. J Multinatl Financ Manag 23(4):338–355

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown R, Lee N (2019) Strapped for cash? Funding for UK high growth SMEs since the global financial crisis. J Bus Res 99:37–45

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown JR, Petersen BC (2011) Cash holdings and R&D smoothing. J Corp Finan 17(3):694–709

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown JR, Petersen BC (2015) Which investments do firms protect? Liquidity management and real adjustments when access to finance falls sharply. J Financ Intermed 24(4):441–465

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown JR, Martinsson G, Petersen BC (2012) Do financing constraints matter for R&D? Eur Econ Rev 56(8):1512–1529

    Google Scholar 

  • Bruinshoofd WA, Kool CJM (2004) Dutch corporate liquidity management: new evidence on aggregation. J Appl Econ 7(2):195–230

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell T, Brendsel L (1977) The impact of compensating balance requirements on the cash balances of manufacturing corporations: an empirical study. J Finance 32(1):31–40

    Google Scholar 

  • Chan SP (2015) Britain on top: recovery from great recession was faster than thought. [Online] Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11900934/UK-GDP-growth-stronger-previously-though-recovery-ONS.html [Accessed 26 September 2020]

  • Chi JD, Su X (2015) Product market threats and the value of corporate cash holdings. Financ Manage 45(3):705–735

    Google Scholar 

  • Choe H, Kho BC, Stulz RM (2005) Do domestic investors have an edge? The trading experience of foreign investors in Korea. Rev of Financ Stud 18(3):795–829

    Google Scholar 

  • Chung H (2017) R&D investment, cash holdings and the financial crisis: evidence from Korean corporate data. Appl Econ 49(55):5638–5650

    Google Scholar 

  • Corrado C, Haskel J, Jona-Lasinio C, Iommi M (2013) Innovation and intangible investment in Europe, Japan, and the United States. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 29(2):261–286

    Google Scholar 

  • Correia S (2016) A feasible estimator for linear models with multi-way fixed effects. Working Paper (March). Retrieved from http://scorreia.com/research/hdfe.pdf

  • Deloof M (2003) Does working capital management affect profitability of Belgian firms? J Bus Financ Acc 30:573–587

    Google Scholar 

  • Dittmar A, Mahrt-Smith J (2007) Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings. J Financ Econ 83(3):599–634

    Google Scholar 

  • Dittmar A, Mahrt-Smith J, Servaes H (2003) International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. J Financ Quant Anal 38(1):111–133

    Google Scholar 

  • Driver C, Muñoz-Bugarin J (2019) Financial constraints on investment: effects of firm size and the financial crisis. Res Int Bus Financ 47:441–457

    Google Scholar 

  • Economics O (2013a) Why has the UK recovery been so weak? Econ Outlook 37(2):5–12

    Google Scholar 

  • Economics O (2013b) Why has the recovery in UK business investment been so weak? Econ Outlook 37(1):30–39

    Google Scholar 

  • Faccio M, Lang LHP (2002) The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. J Financ Econ 65(3):365–395

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama EF, French KR (1997) Industry costs of equity. J Financ Econ 43(2):153–193

    Google Scholar 

  • Fama EF, MacBeth JD (1973) Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. J Polit Econ 81(3):607–636

    Google Scholar 

  • Fazzari SM, Hubbard RG, Petersen BC (1988) Investment, financing decisions, and tax policy. Am Econ Rev 78(2):200–205

    Google Scholar 

  • Ferreira MA, Vilela AS (2004) Why do firms hold cash? Evidence from EMU countries. Eur Financ Manag 10(2):295–319

    Google Scholar 

  • Florackis C, Sainani S (2018) How do chief financial officers influence corporate cash policies? J Corp Finan 52:168–191

    Google Scholar 

  • Foley FC, Hartzell JC, Titman S, Twite G (2007) Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation. J Financ Econ 86(3):579–607

    Google Scholar 

  • Foray D, Hall BH, and Mairesse J (2007) Pitfalls in estimating the returns to corporate R&D using accounting data. CDM working papers series CEMI-working paper-2007-003

  • Forero-Laverde G (2019) Stock market co-movement, domestic economic policy and the macroeconomic trilemma: the case of the UK (1922–2016). Financ Hist Rev 26(3):295–320

    Google Scholar 

  • Frésard L (2010) Financial strength and product market behavior: the real effects of corporate cash holdings. J Financ 65(3):1097–1122

    Google Scholar 

  • Froot KA, Scharfstein DS, Stein JC (1993) Risk management: coordinating corporate investment and financing policies. J Finance 48(5):1629–1658

    Google Scholar 

  • Gallemore J, Labro E (2015) The importance of the internal information environment for tax avoidance. J Account Econ 60(1):149–167

    Google Scholar 

  • Gao X, Zhao J (2021) R&D dynamics and corporate cash saving. Rev Econ Dyn. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2021.02.008

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • García-Teruel PJ, Martínez-Solano P (2008) On the determinants of SME cash holdings: evidence from Spain. J Bus Financ Account 35(1–2):127–149

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodridge P, Haskel J, Wallis G (2013) Can intangible investment explain the UK productivity puzzle? Natl Inst Econ Rev 224:R48–R58

    Google Scholar 

  • Graham JR, Leary MT (2018) The evolution of corporate cash. Rev Financ Stud 31(11):4288–4344

    Google Scholar 

  • Guney Y, Karpuz A, Ozkan N (2017) R&D investments and credit lines. J Corp Finan 46:261–283

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall BH, Lerner J (2010) The financing of R&D and innovation. Handbook of the economics of innovation Elsevier, pp 609–639

    Google Scholar 

  • Han S, Qiu J (2007) Corporate precautionary cash holdings. J Corp Finan 13(1):43–57

    Google Scholar 

  • Harford J, Mansi SA, Maxwell WF (2008) Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. J Financ Econ 87(3):535–555

    Google Scholar 

  • Haushalter D, Klasa S, Maxwell WF (2007) The influence of product market dynamics on a firm’s cash holdings and hedging behavior. J Financ Econ 84(3):797–825

    Google Scholar 

  • He Z, Wintoki MB (2016) The cost of innovation: R&D and high cash holdings in U.S. firms. J Corp Finan 41:280–303

    Google Scholar 

  • Himmelberg CP, Petersen BC (1994) R&D and internal finance: a panel study of small firms in high-tech industries. Rev Econ Stat 76(1):38–51

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoberg G, Phillips G, Prabhala N (2014) Product market threats, payouts, and financial flexibility. J Finance 69(1):293–324

    Google Scholar 

  • Itzkowitz J (2013) Customers and cash: how relationships affect suppliers’ cash holdings. J Corp Finan 19(1):159–180

    Google Scholar 

  • Jensen MC (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. Am Econ Rev 76(2):323–329

    Google Scholar 

  • Jin Y, Luo M, Wan C (2018) Financial constraints, macro-financing environment and post-crisis recovery of firms. Int Rev Econ Financ 55:54–67

    Google Scholar 

  • Jiraporn P, Jiraporn N, Boeprasert A, Chang K (2014) Does corporate social responsibility (CSR) improve credit ratings? Evidence from geographic identification. Financ Manage 43:505–531

    Google Scholar 

  • Jung K, Kim B (2008) Corporate cash holdings and tax-induced debt financing. Asia Pac J Financ Stud 37(6):983–1023

    Google Scholar 

  • Keynes JM (1936) The general theory of employment, interest and money. McMillan, London

  • Kilincarslan E (2019) Smoothed or not smoothed: the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on dividend stability in the UK. Finance Res Lett 38:101423

    Google Scholar 

  • Kusnadi Y, Wei K (2011) The determinants of corporate cash management policies: evidence from around the world. J Corp Finan 17(3):725–740

    Google Scholar 

  • La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A (2008) The economic consequences of legal origins. J Econ Lit 46(2):285–332

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazaridis D, Papadopoulos G (2002) Financial management, vol B. Lazaridis-Papadopoulos Editions, Thessaloniki

    Google Scholar 

  • Le DH, Tran PL, Ta TP, Vu DM (2018) Determinants of corporate cash holding: evidence from UK listed firms. Bus Econ Horiz 14(3):561–569

    Google Scholar 

  • Li X, Luo D (2020) Increase in cash holdings of U.S. firms: the role of healthcare and technology industries. J Bus Res 118:286–298

    Google Scholar 

  • Lyandres E, Palazzo B (2016) Cash holdings, competition, and innovation. J Financ Quant Anal 51(6):1823–1861

    Google Scholar 

  • Ma L, Mello AS, Wu Y (2020) First-mover advantage, time to finance, and cash holdings. J Corp Finance 62:101584

    Google Scholar 

  • Mann M, Byun SE (2017) To retrench or invest? Turnaround strategies during a recessionary time. J Bus Res 80:24–34

    Google Scholar 

  • Marshall A, McCann L, McColgan P (2018) The market reaction to debt announcements: UK evidence surrounding the global financial crisis. Br Acc Rev 51(1):92–109

    Google Scholar 

  • Martynova M, Renneboog L (2011) Evidence on the international evolution and convergence of corporate governance regulations. J Corp Finan 17(5):1531–1557. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.08.006

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mikkelson WH, Partch MM (2003) Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance? J Financ Quant Anal 38(2):275–295

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller MH, Orr D (1966) A model of the demand for money by firms. Q J Econ 80(3):413–435

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitani H (2020) Predation risk, market power and cash policy. Manag Financ 46(7):897–911

    Google Scholar 

  • Modigliani F, Miller MH (1958) The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. Am Econ Rev XLVI I(3):261–297

    Google Scholar 

  • Morellec E, Nikolov B, and Zucchi F (2014) Competition, cash holdings, and financing decisions. Working paper, ecole polytechnique federale de lausanne

  • Myers SC, Majluf NS (1984) Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. J Financ Econ 13(2):187–221

    Google Scholar 

  • Nadiri MI (1969) The determinants of trade credit in the US total manufacturing sector. Econometrica (Pre-1986) 37(3):408

    Google Scholar 

  • Nason RS, Patel PC (2016) Is cash king? Market performance and cash during a recession. J Bus Res 69(10):4242–4248

    Google Scholar 

  • OECD (2009) The impact of the global crisis on SME and entrepreneurship financing and policy responses. In: Contribution to the OECD strategic response to the financial and economic crisis. Centre for entrepreneurship, SMEs and local development. https://www.oecd.org/industry/smes/43183090.pdfhttps://scholar.google.com/scholar_lookup?title=The%20impact%20of%20the%20global%20crisis%20on%20SME%20and%20entrepreneurship%20financing%20and%20policy%20responses&publication_year=2009

  • Office for National Statistics (2019a). Business enterprise research and development, UK: 2018. [Online] Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/researchanddevelopmentexpenditure/bulletins/businessenterpriseresearchanddevelopment/2018 [Accessed 17 April 2021]

  • Office for National Statistics (2019b). Household income inequality, UK: financial year ending 2018. Newport. [Online] Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/bulletins/householdincomeinequalityfinancial/yearending2018 [Accessed 26 September 2020]

  • Opler T, Pinkowitz L, Stulz RM, Williamson R (1999) The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. J Financ Econ 52(1):3–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Ozkan A, Ozkan N (2004) Corporate cash holdings: an empirical investigation of UK companies. J Bank Finance 28(9):2103–2134

    Google Scholar 

  • Palazzo B (2012) Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns. J Financ Econ 104(1):162–185

    Google Scholar 

  • Phan HV, Nguyen NH, Nguyen HT, Hegde S (2019) Policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings. J Bus Res 95:71–82

    Google Scholar 

  • Pinkowitz LF, Stulz RM, Williamson RG (2013) Is there a US high cash holdings puzzle after the financial crisis? SSRN Electron J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2253943

  • Rhodes C, Hutton G, Ward M (2021) House of commons library: briefing paper: number SN04223, 16 March 2021: research & development spending

  • Roodman D (2009) How to do xtabond2: an introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. Stata J 9:86–136

    Google Scholar 

  • Saleheen J, Levina I, Melolinna M, Tatomir S (2017) The financial system and productive investment: new survey evidence. Bank Engl Q Bull Q1:3–17

    Google Scholar 

  • Sánchez JM, Yurdagül E (2013) Why are US firms holding so much cash? An exploration of cross-sectional variation. Federal Reserve Bank St Louis Rev 95(4):293–325

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwab K (2018) The global competitiveness report 2018. Insight report, world economic forum, geneva. [Online] Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2018/05FullReport/TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2018.pdf [Accessed 26 September 2020]

  • Schwetzler B, and Reimund C (2004) Valuation effects of corporate cash holdings: evidence from Germany. HHL working paper, HHL–Leipzig graduate school of management

  • Shyam-Sunder L, Myers SC (1999) Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure. J Financ Econ 51(2):219–244

    Google Scholar 

  • Sun J, Ding L, Guo JM, Li Y (2016) Ownership, capital structure and financing decision: evidence from the UK. Br Acc Rev 48(4):448–463

    Google Scholar 

  • Thakor RT and Lo AW (2015) Competition and R&D financing decisions: theory and evidence from the biopharmaceutical industry. NBER working paper no. 20903.

  • Vos E, Yeh AJY, Carter S, Tagg S (2007) The happy story of small business financing. J Bank Finance 31(9):2648–2672

    Google Scholar 

  • World Economic Forum (2018) The inclusive development index 2018. Summary and data highlights, world economic forum, geneva. [Online] Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Forum_IncGrwth_2018.pdf [Accessed 26 September 2020]

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Konstantinos Gkillas.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendices

Appendix A

See Table 13.

Table 13 Variable definition

Appendix B

See Table 14.

Table 14 Theoretical model predictions

Appendix C: Cross-industry cash holding

Panel 1: Consumer non-durables

figure a

Panel 2: Consumer–durables

figure b

Panel 3: Machinery, trucks, planes, etc.

figure c

Panel 4: Oil, gas, and coal extracted products

figure d

Panel 5: Chemicals and allied products

figure e

Panel 6: Business equipment

figure f

Panel 7: Telephone and tv transmission

figure g

Panel 8: Wholesale, retail, some services

figure h

Panel 9: Health, medical equipment

figure i

Panel 10: Other, mines, construction, etc.

figure j

This figure provides the average cash holdings for UK listed firms, based on the fama–french 12 groupings, resulting in a total of 10 industries, as displayed in panels 1–10, after excluding non-financial and non-utility firms. Dash lines indicate the average cash to total assets ratio

Appendix D: The trend in the R&D investment proxies

Panel A: Coefficient on R&D-to-Sales

figure k

Panel B: Coefficient on R&D-to-total assets

figure l

Panel C: Coefficient on R&D dummy

figure m

Figure plots the coefficients on R&D to Sales (Panel A), R&D to total assets (panel B), R&D dummy (Panel C) in yearly linear regressions of cash-to-assets ratio, including the same controls used in the baseline model and industry fixed effects. Dash lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals. The R&D Dummy is an indicator that equals 1 if the firm spends R&D and 0 otherwise (He and Wintoki 2016). The sample includes all publicly traded non-financial and non-utility UK firms with positive assets, sales, and non-missing values for cash ratio and the main variables in Amadeus from 2010 to 2018. Standard errors are two-way clustered (by firm and year)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Magerakis, E., Gkillas, K., Floros, C. et al. Corporate R&D intensity and high cash holdings: post-crisis analysis. Oper Res Int J 22, 3767–3808 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12351-021-00660-3

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12351-021-00660-3

Keywords

Navigation