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An interactive multi-criteria approach to admit new members in international environmental agreements

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Abstract

Whether and how new members can join international fisheries agreements, which are in charge of managing the global commons, is a complex issue and remains unresolved in the scholarly literature. This paper presents a simple, participatory and fair procedure, which utilizes the concepts of minimum rights and the nondiscrimination principle to propose “compromise” share of fishing rights to a new member. In the specific case of tuna management in the Atlantic regulated by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, our proposal was tested using a number of fairness indices, namely the Gini Coefficient, the Duclos, Esteban and Ray Index and the Decile Ratio. Then the Reference Point Method, an interactive multi-criteria framework, was used to aggregate the fairness indices in order to balance the allocation principles, namely the equal sharing and the minimum rights. The compromise solution gives priority to the nondiscrimination principle as captured by the ‘equal share’ rationale.

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Source: ICCAT (2016)

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Notes

  1. Jean-Yves Duclos, Abdelkrim Araar and Carl Fortin, “DAD: a software for Distributive Analysis/Analyse Distributive”, MIMAP programme, International Development Research Centre, Government of Canada, and CIRPÉE, Université Laval, http://dad.ecn.ulaval.ca/.

  2. Suffice to say that maximizing objectives can equally be included in the analysis by multiplying by (−1).

  3. Following the Reviewer’s suggestion, we have added Table 7 in the Appendix, which provides the TAC deviations for all possible values of \(\alpha\).

    Table 2 Different TAC allocations according to possible rankings of the rationales, \(0 \le \alpha \le 1\)

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Funding

A. Kampas would like to thank the Department of Bioeconomy and Systems Analysis for its hospitality. Acknowledgements to the financial support from WIDESPREAD-2014-2 (H2020) under grant agreement No 669062.

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Correspondence to Stelios Rozakis.

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Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 6 and 7.

Table 6 Estimates of the evaluating criteria
Table 7 TAC deviations (quantities by country) from the baseline according to different values of \(\alpha\),\(0 \le \alpha \le 1\)

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Rozakis, S., Kampas, A. An interactive multi-criteria approach to admit new members in international environmental agreements. Oper Res Int J 22, 3461–3487 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12351-022-00696-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12351-022-00696-z

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