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A grade-based incentive mechanism with starvation prevention for maintaining fairness in peer-to-peer networks

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Abstract

Free-riding is a desperate and constant menace to many peer-to-peer systems, which violates the cooperation among heterogeneous peers. This paper proposes a grade-based approach, which expeditiously maintains fairness in the network by encouraging the high contributing peers and altogether wiping out the free-riders. The network contribution ratio determines the contribution of users globally and the proposed grading algorithm uses a point-based incentive mechanism which provides credit points to the users with respect to their grade and the transfer of users between each grade is instituted.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirapalli, 620015, Tamilnadu, India

    Moses Dian Samuel

  2. Department of Computer Applications, National Institute of Technology, Tiruchirapalli, 620015, Tamilnadu, India

    Ramadoss Balakrishnan

Authors
  1. Moses Dian Samuel
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  2. Ramadoss Balakrishnan
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Correspondence to Moses Dian Samuel.

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Samuel, M.D., Balakrishnan, R. A grade-based incentive mechanism with starvation prevention for maintaining fairness in peer-to-peer networks. Int J Syst Assur Eng Manag 3, 84–99 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-012-0098-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-012-0098-5

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