Abstract
Following the principles of systemic accident models, in this paper we presented a new framework for modeling organizational aspect of hierarchical safety control structure in complex Socio-Technical Systems. In fact, we introduced a Specific Organizational Feedback Control Loop together with a Customized Process Model to narrow down System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) risk analysis method. Clearly, this modification can be able to adjust STPA for deficiency analysis of organizational safety control structure. As a case study, we used this framework in an aircraft maintenance industry, as a sample system. Indeed, we modeled and analyzed this system’s organizational safety control structure by our new framework. We demonstrated that, the new framework, as a modified version of STPA, can accurately model and analyze the organizational control mechanisms.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Model terminology
Communication Mechanisms a process—or set of processes—that has been set up to communicate specific information among two or more related component in control structure.
Feedback Control Loop is specific and organized communication mechanisms that allows for self-correction of system by providing appropriate tools for integral enforcement of safety constraint.
Organizational Feedback Control Loops The specific feedback control loop that all of its communication channels are a type of organizational mechanism like forms, procedure and etc. additionally, the controller of the loop is organizational component like organizational units, teams and etc.
Control Actions Control Actions are the action that is enforced by control components in hierarchical safety control structure to control of system behavior. Clearly, enforcement of Control Action is the main mission of control components.
Process Model Every controller must contain a model of the process being controlled. This model is Process Model. Whether the model is embedded in the control logic of an automated controller or in the mental model maintained by a human controller, it must contain the same type of information: the required relationship among the system variables (the control laws), the current state (the current values of the system variables), and the ways the process can change state. This model is used to determine what control actions are needed, and it is updated through various forms of feedback.
Organizational Control Mechanisms an organizational process—or set of processes—that has been set up to control specific system by use of Organizational Feedback Control Loops.
Mental Process Models model of the process being controlled that is embedded in mind of a human controller that has base role in organizational control components.
Hazardous Control Action the probable control components’ action that because of any dysfunctionalities could cause violation in safety constraints.
Hazardous System Behavior the probable behavior of the system—as a whole—that may cause to entrance of it to hazardous state.
Necessary Sensing Mechanism is a set of organizational mechanisms that are necessary for:
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achievement of required information among under control process;
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determination of what control actions are needed; and.
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revising process model.
Sensor Mechanism organizational communication channels for transfer of required information to control component.
Interior Analytical Mechanism specific Analytical Mechanism for process of received information to determine appropriate Control Action by control component. This Analytical Mechanism is performed and handled by control component of the loop.
Exterior Analytical Mechanism specific Analytical Mechanism that is needed for processing of information to determine appropriate Control Action. But this Analytical Mechanism is performed and handled by another components of control structures if is requested by control component of the loop.
Request-Receive Mechanisms specific organizational mechanisms for receiving necessary information from other analytical components, if the use of Exterior Analytical Mechanism is needed for processing received information. These mechanisms prepare appropriate context for information exchange between interior and Exterior Analytical Mechanisms.
Analytical Process Loop consist of interior and/or Exterior Analytical Mechanisms together with Request-Receive Mechanisms.
Information Request Mechanism specific organizational communication channels that are used by control component for requesting analytical process from other components. These mechanisms are a part of Analytical Process Loop.
Information Receive Mechanism specific organizational communication channels that are used by control component for receiving analytical process from other components. These mechanisms are a part of Analytical Process Loop.
Non-Control Actions The actions that are performed by control component as an analytical process; for converting received information to appropriate control action.
Actuator Mechanism organizational communication channels for enforcing Control Action to under control process.
Appendix 2. Case study data
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Dehghan Nejad, A., Gholamnia, R. & Alibabaee, A. A new framework to model and analyze organizational aspect of safety control structure. Int J Syst Assur Eng Manag 8 (Suppl 2), 1008–1025 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-016-0561-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-016-0561-9