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Abstract

Security hazards pose serious risk concerns. But, what makes them unacceptable dangers, is our inability to accurately assess and manage them. The prevailing method of using threat, vulnerability, and consequence to arrive at a risk value has a limitation of interdependence of these variables. This is because the adversary plans his attack using the desired consequence to identify the actionable hazard. While engineering failures tend to be random and accidental in nature, security related events are opportunistic and intentional. Security assessment is further challenged by lack of reliable data, while usability expert opinion is limited due to optimism and overreaction. We have proposed a derivation of the standard methods of risk assessment to compensate for these biases.

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Correspondence to Amit J. Mokashi.

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Mokashi, A.J., Verma, A.K. The nature of maritime security risk. Int J Syst Assur Eng Manag 8, 862–866 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-017-0594-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13198-017-0594-8

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