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Conditionally Stationary Equilibria in Discounted Dynamic Games

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Abstract

This paper introduces simple conditionally stationary strategies and related stationary penal codes for dynamic games with perfect monitoring. The class of equilibria that these strategies support is defined—they are called conditionally stationary equilibria. The main results are necessary and sufficient conditions for extremal strategies, or corresponding penal codes, which give the minimal payoffs to players among conditionally stationary equilibria. Results are applied to resource extraction games.

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  1. Department of Economics, University of Turku, 20014, Turku, Finland

    Mitri Kitti

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  1. Mitri Kitti
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Correspondence to Mitri Kitti.

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Kitti, M. Conditionally Stationary Equilibria in Discounted Dynamic Games. Dyn Games Appl 1, 514–533 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0030-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0030-7

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