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A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment

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Abstract

This study conducts a new evolutionary game analysis for industrial pollution management under dynamic punishment mechanism (DPM), in which the central government’s punishment to the local government is taken into consideration. Then, we compared the two models under the DPM. Moreover, a numerical example is given to illustrate the results. The results show that the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise tends to converge to a stable value under the basic model. Notably, when we add the central government’s punishment to the model, the evolution path between the local government and the enterprise will tend to spiral converge to a stable focus. Thus, the new evolutionary game model that we presented is more conducive than the basic model. The central government’s punishment mechanism will take an active role in dealing with industrial pollution problems.

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The data the authors used in the manuscript are simulated data.

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Acknowledgements

Authors would like to thank the Editor and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and detailed suggestions that have improved the presentation of this paper.

Funding

This work was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Beijing, China(Grant No.20GLB028)and Beijing Basic Research Funds for universities in Capital University of Economics and Business.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Management and Engineering, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing, 100070, China

    Fulei Shi, Chuansheng Wang & Cuiyou Yao

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  1. Fulei Shi
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  2. Chuansheng Wang
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  3. Cuiyou Yao
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Correspondence to Chuansheng Wang.

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Shi, F., Wang, C. & Yao, C. A New Evolutionary Game Analysis for Industrial Pollution Management Considering the Central Government’s Punishment. Dyn Games Appl 12, 677–688 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00407-x

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