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Learning, Mean Field Approximations, and Phase Transitions in Auction Models

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Abstract

In this paper, we study an agent-based model for multi-round, pay as bid, sealed bid reverse auctions using techniques from partial differential equations and statistical mechanics tools. We assume that in each round a fixed fraction of bidders is awarded, and bidders learn from round to round using simple microscopic rules, adjusting myopically their bid according to their performance. Agent-based simulations show that bidders coordinate in the sense that they tend to bid the same value in the long-time limit. Moreover, this common value is the true cost or the ceiling price of the auction, depending on the level of competition. A discontinuous phase transition occurs when half of the bidders win. We establish the corresponding rate equations, and we obtain a system of ordinary differential equations describing the dynamics. Finally, we derive formally the kinetic equations modeling the dynamics, and we study the asymptotic behavior of solutions of the corresponding first-order, nonlinear partial differential equation satisfied by the distribution of agents.

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Authors and Affiliations

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Contributions

All the authors contributed on the conceptualization and analysis of the problem; and writing, reviewing and editing of the manuscript; NS and JPP contributed on the design of the computational simulations, and the derivation of the theoretical results.

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Correspondence to Juan Pablo Pinasco.

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This article is part of the topical collection “Learning and Computations in Games and Economics” edited by Mehryar Mohri and Vianney Perchet.

Appendix

Appendix

Proposition 8

When \(f_0 = 1\) in [0, 1], the solution of (5.6) is given by

  • if \(p\le \frac{1}{4}\):

    $$\begin{aligned} f_t = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1_{[t,1-t]} + 2t\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=p &{}\quad 0\le t\le p \\ 1_{[a(t),1-t]} + 2\sqrt{pt}\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=2\sqrt{pt}-t, &{}\quad p\le t\le T:=4p. \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$
  • if \(\frac{1}{4}< p<\frac{1}{2}\):

    $$\begin{aligned} f_t = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1_{[t,1-t]} + 2t\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=p &{}\quad 0\le t\le p \\ 1_{[a(t),1-t]} + (t+a(t))\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=2\sqrt{pt}-t, &{}\quad p\le t\le \frac{1}{4p}, \\ \delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=(2p-1)(t-\frac{1}{4p}) + 1-\frac{1}{4p}, &{} \quad \frac{1}{4p}\le t\le T:=\frac{1}{2(1-2p)}. \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$
  • if \(p=\frac{1}{2}\):

    $$\begin{aligned} f_t = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1_{[t,1-t]} + 2t\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=p &{}\quad 0\le t\le \frac{1}{2} \\ \delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=\frac{1}{2} &{}\quad t\ge \frac{1}{2} \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$
  • if \(\frac{1}{2}\le p\le \frac{3}{4}\):

    $$\begin{aligned} f_t = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1_{[t,1-t]} + 2t\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=1-p &{}\quad 0\le t\le 1-p \\ 1_{[t, a(t)]} + 2\sqrt{(1-p)t} \delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=1-2\sqrt{(1-p)t}+t, &{}\quad 1-p\le t\le \frac{1}{4(1-p)}, \\ \delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=-(1-2p)(t-\frac{1}{4(1-p)}) + \frac{1}{4(1-p)}, &{}\quad \frac{1}{4(1-p)}\le t\le T:=\frac{1}{2(2p-1)}. \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$
  • if \(\frac{3}{4}\le p\le 1\):

    $$\begin{aligned} f_t = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1_{[t,1-t]} + 2t\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=p &{}\quad 0\le t\le 1-p \\ 1_{[t, a(t)]} + 2\sqrt{(1-p)t}\delta _{a(t)}, \\ \qquad a(t)=1-2\sqrt{(1-p)t}+t, &{}\quad 1-p\le t\le T:=4(1-p). \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$

The proof is a direct verification that \(f_t\) solves (5.4) with \(\sigma =0\). First notice that for any t, \(F_t^{-1}(p)=a(t)\) so that

$$\begin{aligned} P_0[f_t](\mu ) = {\left\{ \begin{array}{ll} 1 &{}\quad {\text {if }} \mu <a(t), \\ 0 &{}\quad {\text {if }} \mu >a(t), \\ \frac{p-f_t([0,a(t))}{f_t(\{a(t)\})}&{} \quad {\text {if }} \mu =a(t). \end{array}\right. } \end{aligned}$$

For \(0\le t\le p\), \(\langle f_t,\phi \rangle =\int _t^{1-t}\phi + 2t \phi (p)\) so that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\textrm{d}}{\textrm{d}t} \langle f_t,\phi \rangle =-\phi (1-t)-\phi (t)+2\phi (p). \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, notice that \(P_0[f_t](p)=\frac{1}{2}\) so that the right-hand side of (5.4) is

$$\begin{aligned} \langle f_t, (2P_0[f_t]-1)\phi ' \rangle = \int _t^p \phi ' - \int _o^{1-t}\phi ' = \frac{\textrm{d}}{\textrm{d}t}\langle f_t,\phi \rangle . \end{aligned}$$

This computation holds until there is no more mass on at least one side of \(\delta _{a(t)}\). When \(p\le \frac{1}{2}\) (resp. \(p\ge \frac{1}{2}\)), this holds when \(1_{[t,p]}\) (resp. \(1_{[p,1-t]}\)) collapses to \(\delta _p\) which occurs at time \(t=p\) (resp. \(t=1-p\)).

Let us examine first the case \(p\le \frac{1}{2}\). For \(t\ge p\), we look for a solution of the form \(f_t = 1_{[a(t),1-t]} + (t+a(t))\delta _{a(t)}\). Then \(\langle f_t,\phi \rangle =\int _{a(t)}^{1-t} \phi + (t+a(t))\phi (a(t))\) so that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\textrm{d}}{\textrm{d}t}\langle f_t,\phi \rangle = \phi (a(t)) - \phi (1-t) + (t+a(t))\phi '(a(t))a'(t). \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, with \(P_0[f_t](a(t))=\frac{p}{t+a(t)}\), the right-hand side of (5.4) is

$$\begin{aligned} \langle f_t, (2P_0[f_t]-1)\phi ' \rangle = -\int _{a(t)}^{1-t}\phi ' + (t+a(t))\phi '(a(t)) \Big (\frac{2p}{t+a(t)}-1\Big ). \end{aligned}$$

Equating these two expressions, we see we must choose a satisfying \(a'(t)=\frac{2p}{t+a(t)}-1\), \(t>p\), with \(a(p)=p\). Solving we obtain \(a(t)=2\sqrt{pt}-t\). This computation holds until \(1_{[a(t),1-t]}\) collapses to \(\delta _{a(t)}\), i.e., \(1-t=a(t)\) if and only if \(t=\frac{1}{4p}\), or \(a(t)=0\) if and only if \(t=4p\), whatever occurs first. If \(\frac{1}{4}<p<\frac{1}{2}\), then \(1_{[a(t),1-t]}\) collapses to \(\delta _{a(t)}\) before reaching 0. Then from \(t\ge \frac{1}{4p}\), \(f_t\) is a Dirac mass \(\delta _{a(t)}\), and we can use Proposition 3, for \(a'(t)=2p-1\). This holds until \(a(t)=0\) which occurs at \(t=\frac{1}{2p(1-2p)}\).

If \(p\ge \frac{1}{2}\), the result follows from the case \(p\le \frac{1}{2}\) and Proposition 5.

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Pinasco, J.P., Saintier, N. & Kind, M. Learning, Mean Field Approximations, and Phase Transitions in Auction Models. Dyn Games Appl 14, 396–427 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-023-00508-9

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