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Using linear codes as a fault countermeasure for nonlinear operations: application to AES and formal verification

  • Special Section On Proofs 2015
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Abstract

Recently, Bringer et al. [10] introduced a new countermeasure based on linear codes. This elegant design aims at protecting advanced encryption standard against both side-channel attacks and fault attacks (FA). However, the fault detection during nonlinear operations (for example SubBytes operation) was left as an open question. The present work studies how linear systematic error correcting codes can simply be used to detect fault injections during nonlinear operations in a symmetric block cipher. In particular, for the faults that cause errors with limited Hamming weight, this method can lead to interesting detection capabilities. Considering this way of protecting AES encryption against FA, a concrete implementation is presented. For a given fault model, a methodology of formal verification is applied to some parts of this implementation, assessing the fault resistance of one linear operation AddRoundKey and one nonlinear operation SubBytes.

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Notes

  1. A list and analysis of existing CED techniques can be found in [20].

  2. known as CIS code [11].

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Gemalto, 6 rue de la Verrerie, 92447, Meudon sur Seine, France

    Sabine Azzi & David Vigilant

  2. Trusted Labs SAS - 6, rue de la Verrerie, 92447, Meudon sur Seine, France

    Bruno Barras & Maria Christofi

Authors
  1. Sabine Azzi
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  2. Bruno Barras
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  3. Maria Christofi
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  4. David Vigilant
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Maria Christofi.

Additional information

This work has been partially funded by the ANR project PRINCE. Authors would also like to thank Jean-Henri Granarolo for his help in the development of the TL-FACE tool.

Appendix: Example of verification report

Appendix: Example of verification report

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Azzi, S., Barras, B., Christofi, M. et al. Using linear codes as a fault countermeasure for nonlinear operations: application to AES and formal verification. J Cryptogr Eng 7, 75–85 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0138-1

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